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ABSTRACT 
Huck, Christopher D., M.S., 1977 Forestry 
Issues in Forest Practice Legislation (123 pp.) 
Director: Arnold W. Bolle 
The study was untertaken to determine why legislation 
to regulate forest management practices on private 
land has failed in Montana, and what steps could "be 
taken to increase its chances of adoption. A method 
of comparison was used: studying the similar laws 
and proposals of other governmental entities for the 
purpose of ga.ining knowledge useful in Montana. 
Before studying the laws themselves, the discussion 
addresses tv/o basic issues of forest practice legis­
lation. It identifies the political interests involved 
and their a,ttitudes. And it considers the purpose and 
rationale of such legislation. 
Seven options were selected for study. In addition 
to Montana's proposed law, the laws of California, 
V/aShington, Oregon and Idaho, the Environmental Pro­
tection Agencj^^'s model law and a Sediment Control 
Ordinance proposal of Lewis and Clark County (Helena) 
Conservation District were reviewed and briefed. 
Comparison of these options revealed that the laws 
could be arranged in two general categories: the 
stricter ones, as represented by California's, and 
the milder ones such as Oregon's. The outstanding 
portions of each proposal were studied in light of 
its applicability to Montana's natural and political 
environment. In the course of the discussion, recom­
mendations concerning new or altered provisions were 
set forth. 
Several broad conclusions have been made. The first 
is that political opposition to forest practice legis­
lation is not necessarily a function of its merits. 
But nevertheless, drafters of a bill can work toward 
certain goals: simplicity of language, bureaucratic 
accountability, prote.ction of individual rights and 
attitudes, and future flexibility. 
ii 
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PREFACE 
The people of Montana are blessed with over 22 million 
acres of forest land, and all of the associated benefits. 
Almost 90 percent of the land is classified as commercially 
valuable—able to produce timber. Virtually every acre is 
rich in resources beyond timber. 
There are roughly four acres of public forest land for 
every one of private. But there is only a three to two 
ratio of public to private commercial forest. It follows 
that commercial forest on private lands forms a higher 
percentage of the whole than on public lands. 
This private forest resource is not eternal; it can 
be abused. In our state, some four million acres needed 
restocking or TSI work in 1975. Apparently, many owners 
and operators are failing to use that resource up to its 
potential. To the extent their actions are damaging the 
resource and society's v/elfare, the government has a re­
sponsibility to guide and direct them. This involves 
social, political and legal conflicts. This study recog­
nizes those conflicts and suggests a legal soliation to 
them. 
V 
Legislation is a construct of political compromises 
aimed at solving a technical problem. The problem must 
be felt by society—in this case the citizens of Montana 
—before being acted upon. In recommending forest practice 
legislation for Montana, I believe that a st^^dy of the 
history and the politics of past legislation and current 
proposals can be useful. 
This is a study of the v/ays that people perceive a 
problem and react to its solution. It is a social study, 
rather than a technical or economic one. As such, it is 
subjective. There are no formal analytics, no list of 
parameters, variables and measuring devices. It is a study 
of how different segments of society react to different 
aspects and viewpoints of the same problem. 
My approach is more that of a club than a scalpel. 
In politics, one can seldom analyze one variable minutely 
v;hile keeping the others constant. Everything changes. 
I 
This study reflects the belief that a more accurate set 
of recommendations can result from attacking every aspect 
of the problem superficially than from looking at one 
aspect, e.g. the economic effects of forest practice laws, 
in every detail. 
In this study, I intend to determine vrtiether legis­
lation designed for us in Montana could be effective 
in both protecting the resources and satisfying the 
objectives of the people. The value of my work can 
vi 
Toe judged in three steps: first, to what extent does my 
research attack the problem areas; second, are the research 
based conclusions valid; and third, do the recommendations 
adequately implement the conclusions? But the final test 
* 
will be in takin/r the recommendations out of the book and 
into the field. 
vii 
PART I 
THE ROLE OP GOVERNMENT IN FOREST PRACTICE REGULATION 
In the first part of this study, I v/ish to explore 
the philosophical issues behind forest practice regula­
tion. I believe that it is appropriate and necessary to 
my case that I set out the social, economic and legal 
justifications of such legislation before I begin to con­
sider its legal technology. 
The role of government is that of provider of goods to 
its subjects and mediator of disputes among conflicting in­
terests. "Regulation of these various and interfering in­
terests," wrote James Madison in the 13th Century, "forms 
the principal task of modern legislation." The forest 
practice debate is no exception, I hope to explain the 
character and role of each of the involved interests in the 
debate, drawing from the writings and analyses of the mem­
bers of these respective interests. 
Any government action will please some parties and 
anger others, or fail to please all, equally. Planning and 
regulation tend to expa.nd the rights and liberties of one 
2 
3 
group (e.g. amenity users) while restricting another's (e.g. 
forest operators). Before acting, any potential planner 
should seek to find out whether, and how, his action is 
justified. My own discussion of the forest practice pro-
"blem is brief, but points to a few key considerations. 
One aspect of the general land use debate highlights 
in exemplary•fashion both the legal and social controversy. 
Discussants of the "Taking Issue," as it is called, argue to 
what extent the government is justified in limiting the uses 
(and thereby the value) of land without providing compensa­
tion to its owner, I found from my research that in forest 
practice legislation, as with many resource issues, the 
popular opinion of the issue is more to be feared than its 
legal interpretation. 
There are many other aspects to the problem which should 
be considered were it not for time and space limitations. 
The reader sho^^ld consider these three discussions as a 
cursory review of the field of legal philosophy, not as a 
comprehensive justification of the forest practice laws. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTERESTS AND CONFLICT 
The first step to policy-making should be an identi­
fication and an understanding of the interests involved. 
Each group has its own viev/ of the problem/solution. 
Lawmakers assume that their objective is to maximize 
1* the sum of benefits to these groups. They carefully weigh 
the input of these groups, their testimony of gain or loss. 
And "net social benefit" need not be a monetary measure; the' 
economic assijmption that each individual tries to maximize 
his own welfare extends to \mvalued satisfactions as well. 
r Forest management, as a form of land use', is a good 
[example. The "highest and best use" that the forest land 
assessor sees is not always the landowner's— simply because 
; not all of his value lies in monetary returns, 
\ Land resources are at their highest and best 
\ use when they are used in such a manner as to pro-
\ vide an optimum return to their operators or to 
\ society. Depending on the criteria used, this re-
\ turn may be measured in strictly monetary terms, 
\ in intangible and socia.l values, or in some com-
\ bination of these values. £/ 
\ 
* Notes to the text are numbered and collected by Part, 
and appear at the close of each. 
4 
5 
Whose values are influenced by a forest practice policy? 
The landovvners cited above are but one group. Timber oper­
ators, who deiDend on the forest for their livlihood, are 
another. Foresters, representing both the need for forest 
products and for protection of the environment, are a third. 
And the community at large, the "public," anomic and diffuse 
nevertheless has its own values. 
Large landowners 
I have classified forest landowners into tv/o groups: 
the large owners, chiefly represented by corporate owner­
ships, and small ones, of whom most are individuals or fam­
ilies.^ But, though I am constrained by the research 
others to categorize owners by the size of holding, I feel 
strongly that the more important difference is in the objec­
tives of the owner. 
r Large tracts of land generally signify some conscious 
capital investment. It is with this assumption that most 
authorities state that large landowners seek monetary econ­
omic benefit from their land. Either the land produces a 
regular crop of timber or it is held for speculation, high 
: intensity recreation or some similar use. Forest lands in 
! this state are generally of better than average site quality, 
i V,'ell-managed and readily bought under intensive management. 
V 
(President's Advisory Panel on Timber and the Environment, 
(PAPTE) 1973). 
r The objective of the large forest landowner may be 
summarized (v/ith some simplification) in a v/ord: profit. 
6 
As opposed to piiblic ownerships and small landowners, whose 
investment lies elsewhere, the survival of the industrial 
forest enterprise depends on its ability to make money. 
Corporations have, in theory, an infinite life; there­
fore they have an indefinite planning horizon. This is 
I ideally suited to the grov/ing of trees. An individual lacks 
sufficient time-preference to value the future growth of an 
80 yeg.r crop. The corporation, with its indefinite planning 
horizon and a continually prodizcing unit, can visualize its 
I 
^income as a rate of return instead of a lump sum. 
Industrial owners, contrary to some popular thought, 
have a strong economic interest in protection of the envir­
onment; the days of "cut out and get out" are over. The f 
future income of the factory depends on its present mainten-
ence, 
As economic entities, industries follow the policies 
most efficient in producing the product, Crovernment regu­
lation, particularly added restrictions on sound management 
practices (notice of harvests, for example) reduces cost-
effectiveness of its policies and creates a burden,. Though 
most industrial owners genuinely favor protection of the 
growing environment "recent overzealous attempts by the 
public to regulate forest practices threaten to impose con­
straints beyond those needed to assure rapid growth of new 
timber crops." 
Such regulation can be a disincentive to good forest 
practices by imposing additional, unnecessary costs. It 
will raise the manager's level of uncertainty (by causing 
him to operate closer to the margin), reduce the market 
supply of products and reallocate human and natural resources 
The industrial land mana.ger naturally favors the forest 
practice policy which imposes the least cost on his operation 
The forest industry has taken the initiative in pro­
moting good forestry and thus its own welfare." Associations 
of forest products firms aggressively promote good forest 
5 planning and practice, both nationally and locally. 
Industrial foresters and the SAP joined forces in re­
sponse to public demands in V/est Virginia to draw up volun­
tary standards. (Paxton, 1973) In Mississippi, industry 
didn't wait for public outcry; they adopted their own guides 
in 1973. (Siegal, 1974) In Washington, one company, stating 
a "permanent policy of buying pulp logs from neighboring 
. . . woodland owners" outlined in a series of pamphlets 
good forest practices for every region of the state. (Crown 
Zellerbach, undated) 
In Montana, the Western Wood Products Association, 
outlining its members' efforts to "eliminate the environ­
mental problems it helps to create," notes policies designed 
to recognize the non-monetary values of the forest.^ (State 
of Montana, 1972) One of these policies, concerning roEi.d 
building, was quoted as follov;s: 
8 
Roads shall be planned, located and constructed 
to provide a minim\.im disturbance of the land for 
the standard required. They shall be designed and „ 
constructed to minimize erosion and stream siltation. 
Summarising, the forest products industry — the large 
landowner — har: become one of the foremost proponents of 
good land management practices. V/hile they would prefer 
self-regulation, and probably fight strict controls by the 
state, they have supported and helped to draft legislation, 
including Montana's, to set standards for good forestry. 
Small landowners 
A small woodland generally consists of less than 5,000 
acres, though one source limits it to 2,500. (Prutchey, 1965) 
But the importance of the division is not in acreage, but 
' purpose of ownership. Small ownerships vary in site char-
'acteristics, size of holding, ownership objectives and other 
factors. (PAPTE, 1973) But the dominant characteristic of 
small forest owners is that the forest is not their primary 
^ • 8 source of income. 
I 
I The status of a private v/oodland is almost always the 
I reflection of its owner's goals. Groups may buy land for 
open space, individuals for supplemiental income or personal 
enjoyment. Farmers may keep the property as a hedge against 
junexpected debts or as a supply of posts, firewood and 
I 
Icreek water. 
9 ^ Small ov/ners practice "personal economics." Their 
1 objectives are based not upon what will bring them the most 
I 
I money, but Eire a function of their characteristics, those 
9 
of the tract and the social and economic situation. On small 
ownerships, in my opinion, management strategy is a function 
of personal factors rather than market ones. 
The study of small forest ownerships has a history all 
its own, progressing from study of the property to study of 
the ovmer's economic situation to study of his personal at­
titudes, as researchers gradtially become more avv'are of what 
actually influences owner's decisions, Keniston (1975) 
wrote that studies which relate the management- status of 
I the unit to property characteristics assume that every owner 
i wants to maximize his timber production. Industry, he said, 
j will r\in true to economics of the firm, but a private land-
I owner runs on attitudes and motivation. 
V 
In Montana, private holdings both large and small are 
confined to the bottomlands, the best growing sites. But 
these are often the best — and only — growing sites for 
subdivisions and new agriculture. These sites not only have 
good timber potential, they are close to markets and easy 
of access. 
In Montana and the nation, small-time management stra­
tegies vary to extremes, Worrell (1975) claims that v/here 
timber management is the goal, middle-class, v/ell-educated 
owners generally manage their tracts v/ell and are open to 
suggestions for improvement. But, "because of size, quality 
and ovmership objectives," says PAPTE, small tracts "are 
unlikely to achieve the productivity levels of industrial 
forests." 
10 
But again, v/e must look to the original objectives of 
the ov.'ners. 
^ Some people place a high value on profits and 
the maximization of monetary returns per se. Most 
people, hov/ever, regard monetary returns as an in­
termediate rather than a final goal. For them, money 
is a means to the attainment of more ultimate ends. 
. . . Recognition of this factor is important, be­
cause it explains v/hy landowners frequently fail to 
behave in a strictly economic manner even when it 
^ight be clearly in their financial interest. 10/ 
There is no reason, economic or otherwise, for an owner to 
put his v/oodland under management if development of the area 
will produce less satisfaction thg.n he enjoys now. 
Even economically inclined small forest owners can give 
1 several reasons for not managing: lack of time, capital or 
! ' • ' 
I 
|j;echnical Itnowledge. (Frutchey, 1965) They may feel that 
the returns on their efforts are too low, or they may be 
holding the land for speculation. (Anderson,. 1975) For 
farmers, forest management must compete with other farm, 
responsibilities. 
Small forests are a great national resource only if 
managed and managed v/ell. For the potential small forest 
manager, the understanding and adoption of good management 
practices may take time. Very possibly they won't, as PAPTE 
claimed, reach the productivity of large acreages. The ease 
with which these good practices are adopted depends again on 
attitudes and motivation. 
Persuading the economically inclined sma.ll forest owner 
to, one, put his forest under management and, two, use good 
11 
methods, is a continuing headache for government planners. 
I've limited the scope of this study to consideration of 
forest practice legislation to achieve the latter objective; 
most authors, though, recognize that programs of assistance 
11 and group action are nearly as valuable. (Worrell, 1975) 
Both large and small forest owners have interest in 
such legislation, as I have indicated. While large ovmers 
concern themselves more with profit margins, small owners 
are protective of their right to do what they want v/ith 
their property. This is v/hat the government planner hears. 
Forest operators 
Forest operators, too, can be divided into large and 
small enterprises. But unlike some owners, every timber 
operation is out to eke a living from the forest. 
Many small-time operators, known as "gyppos" in Montana, 
are landowners as well. They share the "rugged individual" 
image of the pioneer, the attitude that their livlihood is 
their ovv'n making and should be secure from tinsolicited gov­
ernmental interference. 
The gyppo logger runs a marginal operation at best. 
He makes his living by his skill at getting the most footage 
out of the woods. Sometimes, it is to his economic advan­
tage to high-grade the stand and leave marketable but sub-
marginal logs and trees.At other times, a simple lack 
of technical knov/ledge or poor planning will produce the 
same results, (see PAPTE, 1971) When a logger goes into an 
12 
area too small or lightly stocked to assure a profit, bad 
practices invariably result. 
V/e can normally expect the bitterest opposition to 
regulation from the small-time logger. (Cf. Ahner, 1974) 
Not only are adding costs to his already shoestring oper-
a.tion, he says, but we are also trying to dictate how to 
conduct his ovm professionj No one enjoys being dictated 
to, particularly the individualists. 
Corporate forestry is often split into both ovmership 
and operation. That which I stated regarding large forest 
owners goes for 'their timber operations as well. Large oper­
ations do, for the most part, try to police themselves. 
Though individuals in the operation may not follov/ company 
policy, the attitude of the industry as a whole is identical 
to what I outlined earlier. 
Foresters 
The professional forest manager is the expert. In a 
public or private capacity, he decides how to allocate the 
resoiirces ujider his power to competing uses — to provid.e a 
continuous supply of them without deterioration of the 
".factory," The forester is conservationist in the original 
sense of the word — ensuring preserva.tion of future options 
by v/ise exercise of existing ones. 
Forestry's objectives h8.ve shifted with the yestrs and 
the changing scope and awareness of resource values. A 1956 
Forest Service publication offered the follov/ing: "Objective: 
each forest acre growing a commercial forest product." (U.S. 
Forest Service, 1956) Since that time, foresters have grov/n 
to understand that not all forest products are commercial; 
not all owners want to fulfill the same objectives. 
Foresters have a responsibility to maintain a timber 
supp]-y only insofar as that meets the objective of the land-
ov/ner. Foresters are not free to direct resource use to 
their ovm v/ishes; their duty is to maximize the objective 
10 
of the landovmer within the constraints of the" land. 
Forestry is both a natural and a social science. Good 
forestry involves both good land use prs.ctices and consider­
ation of the owner's overall objectives. Good foresters 
treat the natural environment and inter-act with the social 
one. One set of suggestions to extension foresters requests 
that their management program fit the owner's objectives 
before all else. (Prutchey, 1965) 
Even on the National Forests, where the owner's objec­
tives are supposedly more- rigid, foresters are using new 
methods to integrate natural and social values. Sliaping and 
limiting the size of clearcuts, road construction and har­
vesting suioervision are some of the measures ts^ken. (Kemper, 
1976) 
Because in a,ny forest policy debate the forester must 
represent both the natural and social environment, his input 
is critical. Fore stern have, historically taken tlie lead in 
the formation of 'land use policies in Europe and America. 
14 
Organizations such as the Society of American foresters 
(SAP) represent foresters in policy issues.They make their 
otijectives felt in the policy-making process.Their ob­
jectives are, ideally, those of their clients tempered "by 
the constraints of the land. 
The public 
^ The cominunity a,t large has a certain interest separable 
from its many private intej^ests. Clean air and water and an 
! aesthetic environment are "public goods" as the economist 
1 terms them. Society, too, has an interest in supply for 
I fixture generations that few individuals could personally 
^laim. 
Environmental groups often like to represent themselves 
as spokesmen for the public. Insofar as the .public is a 
diffuse group, often with no discernable financial interest 
in an issue, their claim may be valid. But the interest at 
stake is not just that of those who prefer to emphasize 
amenity uses of the land; it includes present and future 
needs for commercial as v/ell as non-commercial forest products. 
V/e see conflict between society and the individual every 
time the actions of a person in maximi/.ing his own interest 
threaten the interests of the community. Community inter­
ests may be intangible; the private operator may not even 
recognize them. The decision-mc3,ker and the public planners 
must 
15 
The social costs of forest management which the land­
owner fails to heed, economists call "spillovers." These 
costs (and sometimes benefits) are evidence of the failure 
of the market system to come to an allocation commensurate 
with demands. Society's interest is affected, but we have 
yet to devise a scheme for market allocation. 
The public decision-maker may wish to internalize these 
spillovers. Our public interest is too large and diffuse to 
accurately price its values. But the government must do so, 
v/eighing what they can from the public voice alongside those 
of the established economic interests. 
There is no lobby, though, for the future. Our decen-
dents are a commimity of interest without a spokesman. 
At times the government plays the role of future ad­
vocate, The state is responsible, it argues, for the inter­
ests of future generations. The importance of this concept 
is clear to foresters. Because the development of a forest 
lasts for generations, a forest "cannot really be owned by 
17 one person." It is owned by he and his unborn children. 
The interest of the public is hard to express and eval­
uate, But its presence is clear. In creating a forest 
l3 policy, la-w-makers must weigh the "povirer of public concern," 
along with the interests of landowners, operators and mana­
gers. That power is yet to be felt in Montana. (Moon, 1975) 
It will come, though, and bring with it a new and larger 
role for government. 
CHAPTER TWO 
TI-IE GOVERNMENT AS REGULATOR 
The role of arbiter for government brings v/ith it the 
onus of regulator. Resolving a conflict requires either 
mutual agreement or imposing a solution. More and more, 
governments choose the latter option. 
Historically, governments have justified their exis­
tence by gu.arding the rights and v/ell-being of citizens. 
But society is growing—ec.onomically, socially and intel­
lectually. "the drift of modern times" v/rites a forester 
"is tov;ard increasing recognition of the public interest" 
and its protection by social action. (Clark, undated) 
?orest practice regulations existed in Europe in the 
14th Century. (PAPTE, 1973) But only within the past 40 
years, planners in America have shown less concern for 
protection of the individual welfare and more for protection 
19 of society's. 
Barlowe (1958) suggests th8,t society has an inherent 
interest in property use because 1) it was the original 
grantor of rights, 2) property has economic and social 
significance to society, and 3) government has a respon­
sibility to maximize social welfare, 
16 
17 
Society's interest is asserted through public planning 
and implemented through regiilation. Planning is "the con­
scious direction of effort tov/ard the attainment of a ra-
20 tionally desirable goal." But in order for any planning 
to be justified, we must prove its effectiveness in achieving 
our social and economic goals. 
Under what conditions is social (governmental) action 
justified? My sources list several rationales. But t'hey 
can all be summarized in two steps. Intervention in private 
affairs is justifiable only if: 
1) the general welfare is not being served by the 
existing situation, and 
2) the proposed action would result in a significant 
21 increase in general welfa,re. 
We can clearly justify social action in cases of national 
need or the prevention of physical harm to others. But v/e 
a.  ̂ - J. * 
find it harder to do so when confronted v/ith problems in 
land use and resource development. Social values become 
less distinct; the social mandate is weaker and individual 
voices stronger. 
This is the case in promotion of good forest practices. 
Though most resource managers will agree that good forest 
22 
management pays off in increased social welfare, the most 
vocal opinion comes from those who pay the costs. 
Nearly all increases in social welfare directly reduce 
some individual freedom. (Klemperer, 1971) The Constitution 
18 
and our legal tradition set out rights and freedoms of the 
individual. Though these rights are seldom fully understood, 
they are heartily defended. Forest policy, v/hen it restricts 
land uses, restricts rights. Are the social benefits of the 
action worth the fight? 
Weakness of the individual 
The very complexity of modern society engenders one 
argument in favor of intervention. Our society is grov/ing 
at a geometric rate, and with it the complexity of our re­
lationships, V/e no longer buy groceries from the local 
farms and shoes from the town cobbler, V/e have grown inter­
dependent to a critical degree. If California farmers get 
a drought, fruit becomes a rarity. If Mideastern oil pro­
ducers cut off our supply, we are paralyzed. 
A further product of our complex society is the super­
abundance of information. No individual can keep informed 
of all the developments that affect him. Each man's disci­
pline and interests are growing, along v;ith the number of 
decisions required of him. The more that decisions require 
increased data, the less able one person will be to make them. 
As individuals we each make decisions, some well-informed 
some not. Each decision contributes to the problem. We are 
unaware, not only of the effects of our single decision, but 
tliat one on top of our previous one, and our neighbor's and 
the folks' in the next town. This "tyranny of small deci­
sions" wastes energy and resources. The cumulative outcome 
19 
of these incremental decisions may be such that no decision­
maker would have chosen that alternative had he known the 
consequences. (iClemperer, 1971) 
This weakness in our society — weakness through nec­
essary dependence on others — leads to susceptability. 
The oil companies are too numerous and complex. No one 
person knows whether or not they are cheating us. And 
although v/e should have an interest in forest land, we have 
not the time or ability to check into it. 
Government is the vehicle v/e look to, to intervene on 
our behalf. V/e, the public, cannot represent our personal 
interests effectively. Government has a more comprehensive 
perspective. So we pay it to ba,rgain for our interests. 
The objective of planning, says the economist, is to 
increase the efficiency of the output. The government's 
role as bargainer is far more efficient than if each of us 
tried to sit down and argue for all our interests with all 
those who influence them. 
Costs and benefits 
Ayer (1973) presents an excellent — and brief — 
STjmmary of the economic rationale for regulation of private 
2 forest management, The government should act, he says, 
only if the actions of a group produce externalities which 
the free market cannot handle to the satisfaction of those 
affected. Albeit, the mechanism of government should be 
efficient. The costs to the state of setting up and running 
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a bureaucracy to administer the program, and to the private 
party, of compliance, must be balanced by the benefits. Is 
meeting the goal worth the public a,nd private costs? If so, 
the action is justified. 
< . 
In theory, government -programs impose on operators a 
cost equivalent to the value of the external "bads" they 
produce. They now must pay for what used to be unnoticed 
24. consequences of their actions. The logger used to ignore 
the fate of his slash or roadfill. Now the government tells 
him that he v^ill have to pay more attention, work more slow­
ly and carefully and perform more tasks. 
In other words, the government now charges him for what 
he used to do ixnobserved. It follows that the price of 
prodviction will rise and the supply will drop. Producers 
of forest products will be less well off, as will buyers. 
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But benefits to the general public will increase, 
Klemperer evaluated Oregon's Forest Practice Act with 
regard to its public benefits. By summing the perceived 
public benefits, he estimated a gross benefit of SlO per 
forest acre from regulation. Though Montanans do not have 
I the reputation of Oregonians for valuing the environmental 
amenities, we do receive the same benefits. On state and 
private lands alone our total benefit from forest practice 
regulation would reach $70,000,000. 
But balance that against the costs; administration, 
increased management intensity and reduced supply. If 
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the ciJinulated social costs are less than the benefits, 
your law is economically justified. 
Effect on operatious 
( How v^ill forest practice regulation affect the use of 
I land? .On areas suitable for forestry, it v/ill intensify the 
I existing forest uses. (Brock, 1975) On the more marginal 
areas and operations, usage will tend to shift away from 
forestry. On farm woodlots and other noncontinuous oper­
ations, it could eliminate forestry altogether unless private 
p ̂  
^operators could be compensated for their increased costs. 
A program of regulation need not shift the operators 
process of decision-making. It should not cause an arbi­
trary management decision. But, it should compel him to 
internalize costs of water pollution or forest degradation, 
(LeMaster, 1975a) In most cases, the operator's total cost 
v;ill rise. Shutdown of marginal operations may result. A , 
policy objective for foresters would ensure that those mar­
ginal shutdowns which occur are those which should otherwise 
fail solely beca.use of poor practices. Such a policy would 
equate submarginal operations with those practicing destruc­
tive forestry. 
Shortcomin;r"s of Government 
Some arguments against regulation are less theoretical. 
For example, the government's inability or reluctance to act 
in a situation may be a ̂  facto argument against its actions. 
The law-making process in state and federal legislatures is 
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a long and complex one. Its very complexity ^— legislators 
feel responsible to examine every aspect of a problem — 
v^orks against it. The legislature thus at times abdicates 
its responsibility. 
Our Montana legislature is a melting pot of ideas and 
desires. It is a "layman legislature" in its finest form. 
But factors other than the simple diversity of views can 
prevent the legislature from making good and timely policy 
decisions. The pressures of time (90 days every tv^o years), 
span of issues and lack of staff all contribute to inade­
quate appraisal of s.ny subject, from wildlife h3,bitat to 
mental health. 
Further, there arfe anti-government attitudes even among 
legislators. One, for example, in debating the 1975 forest 
practice bill, said "if you want to give the government of 
the State of Montana more authority over private land, vote 
for 0;he billQ 
V/hen a problem is serious enough to force action and 
the legislature stands still, the responsibilities usually 
devolve to the administrators. But bureaucracy has the 
reputation for taking action with little public cognizance. 
Government then becomes not one "of the people" but one 
of the bureaucrats. 
Every new program requires a bureaucracy to make the 
day-to-day decisions and the detailed policies. Added costs 
argxie against the program. There is also the incremental 
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increase in the complexity of government. Even politicians 
shrink at times from the intimidating process of bureau­
cratic decision-making. 
The other alternative to the legislature is the local 
governmental entity. The movement to vest more pov/er in 
the local governments is gaining support. But in Montana, 
most coimty governments have shown neither the will nor the 
expertise to lead new programs or take on new authority. 
(Tomlinson, 1972) County commisioners point out that some 
laws and regulations designed for county implementation are 
cost prohibitive in the smaller, poorer counties; they simply 
cannot afford the time or attention required of them by nev/ 
\ 
Vrograms. (Montana, 1974b) 
Compensation a solution? 
The concept of pareto-optimality states that a society 
is ma,king most efficient use of its resources if no one can 
be made better off without another becoming worse off, A 
corollary, the pareto-optimality with compensation criterion, 
states that a shift is justified if the gainers from the 
move can more than compensate the losers. 
Under the economic assumption that producers always try 
to maximize their profits, raising costs through regulation 
as discussed previously, might cause one to reassess his 
alternatives. Public planners might suddenly find that 
their policy of creating better forestry is instead causing 
conveifsion to other uses, (see Lundmark, 1975) The higher 
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cost of new practices retards the use of the land for forestry 
and favors more efficient uses. (Prutchey, I965) 
It is not socially or economically just for forest 
operators to pay for reducing negative spillovers. Their 
costs should decrease with better practices. 
f" One solvxtion lies in compensation. Since the public 
I 
I benefits, it, through the government, should compensate those 
I 
I v;ho provide those benefits-. There are two drav/backs to this 
J 
I solution, though. First is that of specifically identifying 
I 
Lgainers and losers, and degree. Second is the possibility 
that compensation is causing suboptimization, that is, caus­
ing the marginal operations that should shut down to remain 
open. (Klemperer, 1971) 
/' still, direct compensation remains a plausible means 
i 
I of redistributing the costs equitably and incidentally, 
I 
I quieting those v/ho vociferously cry "taking," The "taking 
^ issue" has shovm itself to be one of the strongest and most 
persistant arguments in opposition to governmental planning 
and regulation. The chapter to follow will explain why. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE TAKING ISSUE 
" . . .  t h e  f e a r  o f  t h e  t a l c i n g  i s s u e  i s  s t r o n g e r  
j than the taking clause itself. It is an American 
I fable or myth that a man can use his land any way 
j he pleases regardless of his neighbors. The myth 
i survives, even thrives, even though unsupported by 
I the pattern of court decisions. Thus, attempts to 
1 resolve land use controversies must deal not only 
l^with the law but v/ith the myth as well. 23/ 
There is no legal basis, historical or current, for 
the proposition that a man may do whatever he likes with 
his land. The concept of property includes separable rights, 
referred to in legal parlance as a "bundle of rights." But 
even the fee simple owner does not exercise exclusive con­
trol over his land. His rights are created and maintained 
only b?/ the sanction of the soveriegn. The soveriegn may 
modify or appropriate these rights at a.ny time. 
Many landowners harbor the myth that their exclusive 
rights to O'wnership and use of land have existed from time 
immemorial, or at least since the established Constitutional 
state. But property was once held in common, and has only 
slowly and gradually evolved into an object that one might 
possess to exclusion, (see Barlov/e, 1958) The concept of 
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exclusive ownership peaked in the early 1800's. About the 
same time, the taking question began to emerge. 
In medieval ilngland, v/here our concept of property 
emerged, "the idea that a man may do as he likes with his 
ovm would have been v/holly denied by lawyers' and philosophers 
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of that day. The king had unquestioned right to use of 
private property, providing the public would benefit. The 
concept came to America intact. In fact, the only legal 
restriction to our soveriegn's power to appropriate and use 
land is the self-imposed one: 
" . . .  n o r  s h a l l  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  b e  t a k e n  f o r  
public use without just compensation," 
Early in the 19th Century, there existed no conflict 
between the exercise of the police power and taking by em-
minent domain. Courts construed the Fourth Amendment liter­
ally.. No compensation need be ma.de unless the land v/as 
a.ctually, physically taken. 
As the country grew and land becpane scarcer, j.ts value 
for both public and private lAses increased,V/ith higher 
property values came recognition that simple regulation 
could have a severe, sometimes devastating impact on that 
value. Co'irts began to consider the appp.rent conflict. 
In December of 1922, Justice Oliver VvendelD. Holmes pronoimced 
the now-famous rule: 
r The general rule at least is, that while property 
\ may be re:":ulated to a certain extent, if regulatioh 
j goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 31/ ./ 
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In establishing this balancing test, Holmes had, says 
Bosselman (1973), rewritten the Fourth Amendment, But since 
the high court has decided few takings cases since that land-
ma.rl: one, lower courts are left to interpret the rule. 
By and large, courts continue to uphold responsible 
regulation of la,nd uses. (Bosselman, 1973) Pour tests are 
in common use; If the land is physics.lly invaded by govern­
mental action, a taking occurs. If the ov;ner(s) maintains 
a public nuisance, courts will be less likely to find a 
taking. Courts will often base their judgement on the dim­
inution of value caused by the action, or balance the public 
good to be obtained against the private harm. 
Courts will justify most land use regulation that is 
not a,rbitrary or discrimina,tory and is a reasonable and 
well-designed approach to the felt problem. 
Forestry cases 
The landmark forest practice case V'.'as a 1949 decision 
of the V/ashington (state) Supreme Court (State v. Dexter« 
202 P,2d 906) which upheld the state's Forest Practice Act 
on a Constitutional challenge. It "clearly established that 
forest practice laws directed to priva^te property are Con-
Istitutional and are justified by the need to preserve natural 
1 -\2 
resources for the public v/elfa.re." In the case, a timber 
owner failed to stop the state from requiring, that seed 
trees be left following a harvest. 
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Though Oregon's Forest Practice Act "opposed the phil­
osophy of personal property rights" according to the State 
Forester (Schroeder, 1972) it v/as never challenged and was 
rev,Tit ten in 1971. 
California's Act vva,s declared tmconstitutional in part 
(Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo 
County, 97 Cal.Rptr. 431 (1971)). But the decision addressed 
only the delegation of authority by the st8,te legisla,ture 
for rule-raaking and enforcement, and not the land use 
issue. (Lundmark, 1975) 
Popular view 
Public opinion is often a stronger force than the 
sanction of law. Land use regulation is one case. In 
particular, the neo-individualists, prominent in most rural 
areas and quite so in Ltontana, have the unshakable opinion 
that their property is their ovm, and immime to regulation 
by the government. They have unconsciously allied with 
the land developers and get-rich-quick businessmen who have 
failed to do in the courts v/hat the neo-individualists have 
done politically. 
One result of the resistance of rural conservatives to 
land use regula,tion has been the appropriation (though 
"with compensation") and expliotation of the land by spec­
ulators with less conscientious regard for the land. 
Tho neo-individualists may have a valid point in claim­
ing that the government is treading on their personal 
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liberties. Barlowe (1958) has said that public planning is 
only exhanging the seeiirity of another's decisions for the 
personal freedom to make one's own. The private landowner 
does have rights. But realization is growing that society, 
too, has rights in his property.Thus, we come back to 
the conflict over v/hich rights the owner claims and which 
society claims. 
On one side of the issue is 'society' demanding 
! protection from the negative spillovers,, . . and 
I oftentimes staking an additional claim to the pos-
i itive spillovers, . . On the other side we find 
• the landowner, rarely malicious, but determined 
to cla,im the 'reasonable' uses that ownership has 
historically conferred upon him. 35/ 
Is there a solution to this conflict? If so, it lies 
in good design of regulation and good communication betv^een 
those parties who claim rights and interests, in the re­
source. Francois (1950) suggested one equitable solution: 
if V'/e decide that society must compensate individuals for 
"takings," then, in Justice, we should require entrepreneurs 
to compensate society for diminuation of the social welfare 
in his own interest. Bosselman (1973) cites five alterna­
tive solutions, ranging from ignoring the issue to directing, 
through legislation, vi/hich situations require compensation. 
V/'e would like to design a law v/hich simply does not 
restrict the rights of those who already practice good for­
estry, but v/hich forces compliance on the transgressors. 
Courts and citizens would find this most palatable. It is 
but one of the ideas to keep in mind as we study the le gal 
options n^vailable. 
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Notes: 
1. This objective is echoed by foresters, particularly 
the SAP Task Force on Forest Practices, who recom­
mends "the application of . . . knowledge and , . . 
principles in order that society can obtain the largest 
net sum of benefits from forest lands, , , reflect Ling"! 
full consideration of both social and private costs 
and benefits." (SAF, 1975) 
2, Barlov/e, 1958* P. 13. 
3, Francois (1950) divides forest ownerships into three 
classes; large, family holdings (usua.lly hereditary 
and confined to Europe), comniercial forests and farm 
forests. PAPTE (1973) differentiates only betv/een 
"industrial" and "other private," 
Industrial lands comprise 13 percent "of commercial 
forest land, mostly in the V/est and South, and are 
characterized by intensive management and slow ovmer-
ship turnover. Small ownerships comprise 59 percent 
and are concentra"t;ed in the North and South. PAPTE 
divides small ownerships into farms and miscellaneous, 
noting that over 42 million acres have shifted out of 
farms between 1952 and 1970. The average holding is 
71 acres, 
4, PAPTE, 1973. P. 152. 
5, One of the most notable of these is the'American 
Forest Institute-J-s Tree Farm program. Small Land-
ov/ners can receive assistance, technical and financial, 
from industry in turning their tract into a producing 
forest. (Skok, 1975) 
6, YAVPA estimates that less than ten percent of industry 
lands are being clearcut; other silvicultural systems 
are gaining favor. Line-skidding systems reduce the 
need for roads as well. 
7, State of Montana, 1972. P, 121 
8, "Other private" land covers 296 million acres, generally 
of site class III and IV, In most regions, PAPTE found 
small forests understocked. In 1956, the Forest Ser­
vice found just over half the ownerships in Oregon and 
Washington to be adequately (70 percent) stocked. But 
in the South, private non-industrial owners increased 
the growing stock on their acreages by 56 percent, 
compared to 36 percent for industry. (TIcComb, 1975) 
9, My own term, coined to refer to decision-making based 
upon a person's characteristics, attitudes and in­
clinations rather than his economic possibilities. 
10, Barlowe, p. 114. 
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11. To cite a fev/, the federal-state Cooperative Forest 
Management and cost-share and forest incentive pro­
grams. Government-sponsered community action groups, 
cooperatives and the Conservation Districts are exam­
ples of the latter. 
12. The standard disincentive for this is a penalty of 
triple the stumpage value. 
13. Despite this, PAPTE has given the nation's foresters 
a proposal for meeting the nation's timber and de­
veloped recreation needs while neglecting non-market 
values and ignoring private owner's rights and de­
sires. By conveniently setting a goal of meeting 
the nation's timber demand, they proceeded to propose 
solutions which would be excellent timber management 
and poor people management, 
14. The SAP Task Force on Forest Practices set forth a 
series of recommendations on forest practice legis­
lation, some of which is highlighted later, 
15. SAP's 1975 president, John Beale, remarked in a pub­
lished letter that the SAP does not advocate a forest 
practice act, but would like to ensure that those 
enacted are competent ones. (Beale, 1975) 
16. A preliminary justification for governmental action. 
17. PAPTE, p. 24. 
18. This term was used by Tomlinson, 1972. 
19. For forestry issues, Cf. Keniston, 1975 and Montana's 
EQC Fifth Annixal Report, 
20. Barlowe, p, 461, 
21. The "significance" of the increase is invariably 
defined in economic terms, 
22. "Unregulated forest practices will leave opportunities 
for public action to increase net satisfactions, thus 
suggesting government intervention," Klemperer, 1971. 
P, 200. 
23. Regarding forest policy, Ayers cites "indications that, 
due to market imperfections, some intervention is nec­
essary if certain goals are to be achieved." P, 421 
24. One study in Alberta noted that the costs of road 
construction nearly doubled after imposition of en­
vironmental constraints. (Otten, 197,5) A study in 
the Teton and Boise National Forests showed increases 
in logging, administrative and regeneration costs of 
26 and 14 percent, respectively, directly attributable 
to added environmental measures. (Kemper, 1976) 
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25, The distributive effects of such a program are sig­
nificant, The "benefits will accrue to the group too 
large and diverse to bargain for itself. More to the 
point, the consumers of amenities will benefit which, 
in our society, means those affluent enough to travel 
and buy recreational equipment. The losses v^'ill be 
felt by smaller groups centered around an economic 
interest, such as loggers and farmers, 
26, Several writers propose that forest pra.ctice controls 
be directed only at lands capable of the largest mar­
ginal increase, rather than where management goals 
are questionable or sites unsuitable. (Worrell, 1975, 
PAPTE, 1973) This leaves low stocked, good quality 
industrial lands as prime candidates, (But Of. pp. 9-10) 
27, Article in The Missoulian, February 13, 1975, 
28, Bosselman, 1973. 318-9. 
29, ibid., p, 75• 
30, This phenomenon may have caused the grov/th of the myth 
of exclusive and absolute ownership of property. But 
it also triggered social consciousness of the value of 
land for public benefit, as evidenced by movements to 
establish National Parks and Reserves, and protect 
forests and farmlands from owner abuse, 
31, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon. 260 U,S. 413. 
32, Siegal, 1974. P. 208, 
33, It is almost humorous to note that, though our neo-
individualists profess loyalty to the basic institu­
tion of democracy as expressed in our Constitution, 
they deny the expression of that democracy in the 
actions of government. They will encourage any action 
or pronouncement that strengthens their concepts of 
rights and fight any trend in the opposite direction. 
They regard a relatively recent development as the 
Constitutional truth but choose to ignore a trend of 
longer standing — the regulation of property for the 
public welfare, 
34, Proponents of forest practice legislation have tried 
to include anesthetic rights as one of those protected 
for society. Though landowners would hardly admit 
that "aesthetics" is definable as a right, they have 
successfully fov.ght handing over that right to society, 
(Lukes, 1977b, Mattock, 1977) 
35, Healy, 1976, P, 176. 
PART II 
CURRENT OPTIONS 
Vi/ithin the past seven years, new forest practice 
legislation has been proposed in national, state and local 
governing bodies. This new surge of attention corresponds 
to the increased environmental awareness of the 70's. 
Prior forest practice lav^s dealt with regulation to ensure 
a productive timber resource. The nev/ generation of laws 
and proposals recognize a more diverse set of needs. 
In this Part, I will review a few of the exemplary 
options: their political and legal histories, assessments 
of their effectiveness or failure, and their shortcomings. 
I have chosen seven examples; EPA's model state forest 
practice act, the laws in California, Washington, Oregon 
and Idaho, Montana's proposal and a Lev/is and Cla^rk County 
Conservation District Sediment Control proposal. Each has 
its ov;n unique history and features. 
An overviev^ of the evolution of federal, state and 
local responsibilities begins this discussion. As an aid 
to these options, I include also an outline of each., 
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CHAPTER POUR 
THE FIGHT FOR FOREST PRACTICE ADMINISTRATION 
Historica,lly, most pov/er over the ownership and use 
of private land rests with the ste^tes who have, in turn, 
delegated ratich of it to local government. But the federal 
government has stepped in, in some forms and circumstances, 
vvho has the pov^er to regulate forest practices? V/ell, that 
question has yet to be ans\vered-r-finally. 
Each level has advantages and drav^backs. Federal 
government is often too far av/ay from the problem and con­
cerned with other issues. State government is traditionally 
less efficient, but can ensure stability and continuity 
better than local governments.^ Tjocal officials must at 
the same time govern friends and neighbors and protect 
societjr's interests. Local officials faced with land use 
policy decisions may fail to exercise the power, fearing 
the local citizenry. And they may be all too much aware 
of a decision's impact on the local tax base. Any number 
of political reasons can influence a governing body, 
Montana's EQC has stated that planning and regulation 
should, come from the lowest effective level of government, 
'A'hethcr it be federal, state or local. Each program should 
35 
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be viewed on a case-by-case basis. This is true in the 
case of forest practices. 
Z®deral regulation 
Skok (1975) says that " rcrp.ilation at the national 
level ha-s been a frequently discussed, proposed and re­
jected solution." The debate has surfaced in 1910, 192 3, 
the early 40's and again in 1971. The 1923 controversy 
culminated in the pa.ssage in 1924 of the Clarke-McWary Act, 
providing cooperative forest fire protection V/ith states 
to protect "forest a,nd water resources and the continuous 
production of timber," (16 U.S.C.A, s.564) 
In 1938 a bill to control forest practices v/as intro­
duced into Congress and spurred a presidential study of the 
problem. (PAPTH, 1973) The states took notice; they (and 
industry) favored passage of state laws to forestall Con­
gressional action. 
Schroeder (1972) and Hamilton (1963) have cited the 
threat of federal regulation as a prime mover in passage 
of the Oregon and Hew York laws, respectively. The forest 
industry preferred state laws, too -- possibly because they 
were easier to circumvent. 
The forest Lands Restoration and Protection Act of 
1971 (defeated) proposed licenses for professiona^l fores­
ters and mandatory ha.rvesting plans for private lands. 
Again, the early 70's sav/ scurrying for reform and support 
of state laws. Passage of the P>.'PCA in 1970, with its non— 
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point pollution provisions, requires still more of state 
government. And a draft bill being circulated for comment 
by the Forest Service (PS Draft: 12-23-76) will, at the 
least, revamp federal cooperative forestry programs. 
In most cases, though, the federal government is too 
far away from the people for effective strong-arming. Its 
major approach is now through financial and technical assis­
tance, State control in forest practice administration 
has been tentatively, if not finally, established. The 
federal government can and should play a role in assistance 
programs; the state is talcing the lead in enforcement of 
the policy. But local goverruments claim some role in forest 
practice regulation, too, with or without the authority. 
Local control 
"Local control" is a magic word in current political 
circles. But not all is praise. Local control can bear 
an assortment of connotations^ (from Healy, 1976) 
First, local control can mean the predominance of 
local interests. But community values seldom escape the 
influence of state control. Second, local control may mean 
control by local decision-makers. It implies that decisions 
on a person's land may be made by a drinking buddy, or by a 
local tyrant. Third, local control may mean no control. 
Even the mildest controls signify "taking" for a rural com­
munity v.'here property is the first sjrmbol of v/ealth. Few 
decision-makers would risk their necks over such an issue. 
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T.P, Arvola presents an exemplary model of local-
pstate conflict in California.^ Coimties in that state '/'/ere 
I 
I fighting for control. Montarca faces a different situation, 
5 though. For one thing, counties in Montana have no ordin-
jance-making pov/er unless authorized by the state legisla-
i J 
i 
I ture. In our state, a more likely avenue for local control 
*-is the state's conservation districts. CD's have been 
given the power to regulate by ordinance sediment and ero^ 
sion control. They are just beginning to realize that power. 
•* * * 
It seems apparent that any of the three levels of 
government would like to control the pov/er to regulate 
forest practices, but none are enthusiastic about the 
responsibility. In the chapters to follow, I shall examine 
the most relevant offerings of the federal and state gov­
ernments and the conservation districts. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EPA'S MODEL STATE FOREST PRACTICES ACT 
The Environraenfca.1 Protection Agency is the federal 
a.:?;ency created to oversee the federal role in environmental 
affaArs. Hearly all the afrency's powers derive from recent 
legislation such as the Clean x\ir Act Amendments of 1970 
(42 IJ.3.C.A. 18^7) and the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972. (PL 92-500)^ 
Section 203(b) of PV/PCA requires states to prepare 
a process to (i) identify, if aporopriate, afrri-
culturally and silviculturally related nonpoint 
sources of pollution . . . (ii) set forth proce­
dures and methods (including land use requirements) 
to control to the extent feasible such sources. 
The administrator of the EPA must (section 304(e)) 
issue to states , . . information including (l) 
guidelines for identifying and evaluating the 
nature and extent of nonpoint sources of pollu­
tants, and (2) processes, procedures and methods 
to control pollution resulting from— 
(A) agricultural and silvicultural activities, 
including runoff from fields and crop and 
forest lands. 
The 8,gency chose to prepare an exemplary forest practice 
act as one aporoach to that duty.^ (Aronoff, 1975) 
Actually, the EPA fulfilled its 304 charge via three 
separate approaches. First, the agency researched methods 
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of evaliiation and control of silvicultural pollution. Two 
reports on this topic appeared in October, 1973. Secondly, 
a rei?;ional team came together in Seattle to consider "tech­
nical, legal and administrative mechanisms which can be 
used to minimize water pollution arising from forest manage-
6 
ment activities." Thirdly, the agency itself looked at 
existing federal and state legislation. The forest prac­
tice act is a result of both the second and third approaches. 
It aims to ensure that forest operators use the "best known 
management prsxtices" thus preventing the cause of pollu­
tion rather than controlling the sjrmptoms. (Agee, 1972) 
Reaction 
The agency offered its proposal as a vehicle for 
thought and discussion, it said, and without recommenda­
tion. (Agee, 1972) Discussion, it aroused. The first 
draft of the bill, in November of 1974, prompted several 
hundred written comments, mostly from the industry sector. 
(United States EPA, 1975b) Conmientators criticized "scenic 
beauty" as a consideration, proportion of representation 
on forest practice•boards and the administrative compli­
cations of the act. Many of these suggestions v/ere heeded 
in the later drafts, (Aronoff, 1975) 
In addition to comments on the language of the model 
act, some also questioned its purpose, Fred March, a coimsel 
for EPA, pointed out that the act did not clearly state its 
purpose, viz, prevention of polluting practices, ( Johnson, 
1975) Several other commentators sug^^ested also that FWPCA 
at least be cited as justification for the actions. Dennis 
LeMaster, in a Journal of Forestry article, noted that the 
proposal made no attempt to measure the degradation or 
restoration of v/ater quality,-and also that passage of the 
law in itself did not assure a state of meeting its 208 
responsibilities. (LeKaster, 1975) 
The latest draft of the EPA model has been neither 
endorsed nor adopted by any state-level entities. But it 
has stimulated discussion and some ap-nrehension among pro­
fessional forest managers and landowners on account of its 
provisions and approaches. It has offered new ideas and 
alternatives, some better than others v/hen we apply them 
to Montana's case, as I shall in Part III. 
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STATE FOREST PRACTICES ACT (EPA DRAFT, March 13, 1975) 
1) TITLE: ( ) Forest Practices Act. 
2) POLICY/PURPOSE: Act encourages forest management 
serving the public need for timber and other forest 
products and the protection of water and soil. 
Purpose of act is to create a comprehensive system 
of regulation, and to achieve compliance v\rith fed­
eral laws and regulations. 
3) DEFINITIONS. 
4) STATE FOREST PRACTICE BOARD: Appointed from the 
general public. Persons with direct financial 
interest in forestry may not form majority. 
Four-year, overlappijig terms. 
5) DUTIES OF BOARD: Divides state into districts based 
on geophysica.l similarities. Board makes regula­
tions applicable to each district, with public 
review, and acts as appellate body. 
6) DIRECTOR OF BOARD: State Forester. 
7) REGULATIONS: Required for reforestation, streambank 
protection, erosion control, air and v/ater quality, 
insect and pest control and timber harvesting plans. 
Interagency (state) cooperation. Individual var­
iances allowed upon proof of non-degradation. 
8) TIMBER IIARVI' jSTING PLAN; Professionally prepared plan 
required for operations over ( ). Plan is the 
responsibility of timber owner and must include 
description of silviculture used and jjlans for 
erosion control, reforestation and protection of 
unique areas. No state approval required. 
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NOTICE: Operator must notify state forester at least 
seven da^/s prior to commencing operation. 
INSPECTIONS: State forester or representative may 
mtake all necessa-ry inspections. 
VIOMTIONS: State forester notifies operator of the 
violation, includes order to cease and repair 
damages. State forester may, with "board approval, 
perform needed repairs and charge costs as lien 
against property of operator and owner. Affected 
parties may appeal. 
PENALTIES: Civil penalty for infraction of rules or 
failure to comply with orders, 
LICENSING- OP OPERATORS: Timber operators must have 
state-issued licenses, renewed a^nnually. License 
may be denied or revoked for failure to operate 
v.'ith a license or non-corapliance with rules and 
regulations. 
CITIZEN'S SUITS: Citizens may bring suit against 
board or the state forester for failure to perform 
duties as required. 
CHAPTER SIX 
FOREST PRACTICE LAWS IN T?IE WESTERN STATES 
In 1973, 16 of the 50 states had some form of forest 
practice law. In the Rocky Mountain-Pacific region, Colo­
rado, vliromlng and Montana have no laV'/s. Four states which 
do, I have singled out for study because of their physical 
and social siraila.rities to Montana. 
California 
Of the four states, California is probably•least like 
Montana. Pressures of population create demands for both 
timberland and open space. More people mean more pressures 
and more problems. 
California enacted forest practice legislation in 
1945, but amendments and criticism hindered the law. Envi­
ronmental advocates claimed that the lav/'-s purpose, "to 
conserve and maintain the productivity of the timber lands," 
placed too little emphasis on non-market resources. Some 
landowners felt that the law v/as too strict and a violation 
of their property rights. And administrators pointed up 
the cumborsome enforcement procedures, loopholes and in-
adeqxaate funding to carry out th© law.(Arvola, 1970) 
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•Beginning in 1967, the old forest practice lav/ was 
scrutinized and revisions proposed by the SAP,, industry and 
legislative committees. Not everyone was convinced that 
a new law was needed until, in 1973, the state Supreme 
Q 
Court declared parts of the old law unconstitutional. 
In that year, the California Legislature passed the 
Z ?berg-Negedly Forest Pra.ctice Act (Div. 4, Chap. 8, Public 
Resources Code). Many consider the new law to be the 
strictest in the nation. (Siegal, 1974) The law allows 
counties to enact their own regulations, requires timber 
harvesting plans approved by the state, sets up r^egional 
advisory committees and establishes some regulations con­
cerning residual stocking, fire control measures and soil 
and water protection. 
The 'California Act seems an exercise in superfluous 
language. In briefing it, I found that several provisions 
are unnecessarily repeated as portions of others, and others 
are simply extraneous. Other critics, too, have pointed 
to the complexity and administrative burden of the law. 
In mid-January of 1975, a state court invalidated a later 
amendment to the law which had exempted it from the re­
quirements of the California Environmental Quality Act. 
(California, 1975) These shortcomings impair the effec­
tiveness of the law. 
Since the enactment of its Act, the state has added 
48 full-time foresters to its staff. During 1975, the 
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Division of Forestry issued 1,266 licenses to timber oper­
ators, made 5,668 inspections and reviewed 2,152 timber 
harvestine'; plans. In that year, the Division estimated a 
96 percent compliance rate. (California, 1975) Most of the 
violations were operators failing to notify the Division 
of termination of their operations. 
This year, the California Assembly is conducting over­
sight hearings, v/hich the Division anticipates will result 
in amendments "oriented to more consideration of the environ­
ment in conducting of timber operations." (MacClean, 1976) 
Washington 
The state of Washington resembles Montana in physio­
graphy. It has its wet and dry, mountainous and flat re­
gions. The state depends on the productivity of its forest 
lands for economic and social benefits. But the two states' 
social climate differs. Washington's urban population, 
and the way of thinking that goes with it, is spreading and 
growing. As urbanites grow in raw numbers and percentage 
of the popula-tion, their influence grov/s, too. As in Cal­
ifornia, their demand for all land uses grows in kind. 
The state enacted forest practice legislation for the 
first time in 1945. The law was timber oriented. But 
cutting and regeneration standards were written into the 
9 law, making it difficult to alter as times changed. The 
1945 law was the point in controversy in State v. Dexter, 
referred to on page 27. 
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In 1973, a revised forest practice law was introduced 
in the Washington Legislature. The bill reflected strong 
environmental interests, although "preservationists were 
rebuffed in attempts to include orovision for wilderness 
. . , on private lands, crimina.1 . . . penalties and a 
strict system of pennits."^^ 
The 1974 and 1975 sessions^^ passed the current law. 
The Act has extensive legal requirements and options for 
enforcement and rule-making. Administratively, it is an 
expensive law, since it involves at least five agencies 
and several levels of regulation. 
The state's Division of Forestry, which is the lead 
agency, had some doubts about the la-w, since resolved. 
Forester Bruce T'onell (1977) commented that there were 
"rough spots" but the Act is now working well. Earlier, 
Don Lee Fraser (1974) — the State Forester — complained 
that the new lav/ permitted too many agencies to have a 
"finger in the pie." But, he said, with a little effort 
it would be worked out. 
I have not yet received figures on the costs or the 
effectiveness of the administration of the Act. 
Oregon 
Oregon and Y/ashin9-ton are physiographic twins. Oregon 
stands out, though, with its strong reputation for environ­
mental consciousness. Oregon's Forest Practice Law is not 
stricter as a result; it is easier to understand and enforce 
than either California's or Washington'fj. 
48 
Oref^on's 1941 law, the Conservation Act, was one 
spurred by the threat of federal legislation. It had the 
early support of forest industries in the state, though it 
was considerc;d "very progressive." (Schroeder, 1972) Its 
provisions were administered by a forest practices board, 
which had been formed in 1911 v/ith seven members. The 1941 
l8,w had limited scope and effectiveness. It addressed only 
the timber supply problem, through reforestation. Enforce­
ment was lacking —- forfeit of bond or pa^ymerit of planting 
fees vera the only penalties. And, ].ilce its contemporaries, 
it was to inflexible to meet the changes. (Siegal, 1974) 
Concern over the law solidified in 1968 with a meeting 
of 41 forestry leaders to discuss and recommend changes. 
As a result of this m.eeting, the Board of Forestry in Sep­
tember recommended that 
the early accomplishments of the Conservation Act 
... be recognized, but that it was now necessary/ 
to update the Act in keeping with broader public 
interests and increasing Icnowledge of the effect 
of forest conditions on the various forest benefits. 
The Department of Forestry drafted a. bill v/ith the help 
of other interest groups. Surprisingly, v.'hen the Depart­
ment's bill entered the legislature, industrial interests 
proposed a SLibstitute bill. The opposing forces compromised, 
and the new version passed without trouble. (Mattock, 1977) 
In a Ph.D. Dissertation the same year (completed before 
the new law passed), Dave Xleraperer outlined the administra­
tive goal of the ne-.v policy: costs should be minimised 
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t'hrough single agency administration, with minimal permit 
and inspection requirements. Gene Mattock (1977) of the 
State Forester's office stressed, too, the key goal of 
single agency administration. It seems the goal v/as achieved; 
V.'ashington* s Law involves at least five agencies, Oregon's 
ono,^^ Oregon's Lav/ also emphasizes standards rather than 
practices. This approach hp,s been favored lately, though 
California still emphasizes the latter. (Siegal, 1974) In 
the Board and agency rule-making, three goa;ls come through; 
1) the emphasis is on prevention of the damage rather 
than enforcement after the fact, 
2) single agency administration is the goal, and 
3) wherever possible, cooperation between agencies, 
industry and the public is encouraged. (Oregon, 1977) 
Though by most accounts the Forest Practice Act is 
working well, some groups have attempted to change the di­
rection of policy-making. HB 2997, introduced in the 1977 
session, would reduce the number of persons having "economic 
interest" in forestry from six to "not more than four" on 
the state Board, and from 2/3 to "not more than 1/3" on 
local committees.Such a change would reduce not only 
the number of industry representatives; it wotild eliminate 
local landowners and operators as well. 
Right now, the Act seems to be v/orking the best of 
any in the Western states. Somewhat over 14 man-years were 
expended in enforcing the law in its first year, 2/3 in 
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15 inspections. Citations in the first year totaled 128, 
most of them for failure to submit a notice or inadequate 
stream protection. Violations split evenly between large 
and small operations. (Oregon, 1973) Over the first 14 
months, the compliance rate v.'as 93 percent, (Siegal, 1974) 
and rose to 98.3 percent in 1976. In that year, the agency 
made 8,760 contacts, about 11 percent of which required 
some form of remedial action. The budget for enforcement 
over the biennium was ii>l,263,460 including roughly 37 full 
time positions, (Oregon, 1977) 
Idaho 
Of the four states in my review, Idaho is nearest to 
Montana, both physically and sociologically. Besides 
bounding our state, it has the same open, dry plains and 
rocky, steep forests. It also has an urban population, 
but one which does not threaten to sv/eep over the rural 
communities, a,nd landowners who fight tooth and nail to 
keep their government to a minim\xm. In fact, Idaho so 
resembles Ilontana that the state successfully adopted our 
forest practice proposal — almost unaltered — in their 
own legislature, 
Idaho's first law, the 1937 Cooperative Sustained 
Yield Districts Act, established rules by legislation and 
16 
was similar in structure to Washington's 1945 law. And, 
like its contemporaries, the much-amended law was criti­
cised for being narrow, lenient and inflexible. (Siegal) 
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The current law passed the 1974 Legislature after 
sponsership "by the Idaho Forest Industries Council. The 
legislature made only one change in the bill; it removed 
landowners from the lien liability. 
The politics of passage must have been fascinating. 
The Department of Lands (the lead agency) ignored the bill, 
fearing the label of "empire-building." And the environ­
mental groups remained neutral; their support would have 
meant sure death in the conservative legislature. (Gillette, 
1977) Though the Forest Practice Act met no opposition in 
the legislature, one state official described the subsequent 
rule-making hearings in Northern Idaho as "brutal." Land­
owners came loaded for bear, and the local right-wing 
element appeared in force. Because of this opposition, 
forest practice rules went into effect only last summer, 
and foresters have been instructed to enter lands only 
v?ith the landowner's permission. (Gillette, 1977) 
Several lav/suits were filed to enjoin the enforcement 
of the law, but all were dismissed for vagueness. (Moon, 
1975b) The Department feels it may be facing-the first 
legal challenge to its regulations in early 1977. 
State Lands has hired five new foresters and spent an 
estimated $70,000 to administer the law, but is losing groimd. 
It makes inspections, on a "oriority basis, of reported vio­
lations and high damage potential areas. Compliance is 
about 90 percent, with many violations minor. 
Z'BERG-NEJEDLY FOREST PRACTICE ACT OP I973 
(div, 4, chap. 8, Pub. Res. Code) 
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1) GEiTERAL PROVISIONS: The State shall encourage manage­
ment which considers the public need for all re­
sources. Purpose of lav; is to create regulation 
v;hich assures timber productivity and resource 
values. Counties have authority to create their 
own regulp.tions. Annual reports from the Board. 
2) DEFiniTIONS: extensive. 
3) DISTRICTS AND COMMITTEES; At least three districts, 
to be determined by physical similarities. Nine 
member district advisory committees, five from 
public, three from industry, one from range-livestock. 
None may have direct financial interest in timber. 
4) RULES AND REGULATIONS: Board adopts district rules 
for fire- control, erosion, water quality, stocking 
and harvest plans. Rules must be based on inter­
disciplinary study and public hearings. 
5) RESOURCE CONSERVATION STANDARDS: Legislative standards 
governing residual stand stocking levels and fire 
protection zones. Directs the im-olementation of 
soil erosion studies and waterway protection rules, 
6) LICENSES: For ti^riber operators, renewed annually. 
License may be denied or revoked for failure, to 
comply with rules, 
7) TI!.l BER HARVESTING: Timber operations require harvest 
plan prepared by professional forester and approved 
by State Forester, Copies of plan go to State Board 
of Equalization and the county assessor. Profes­
sional forester must reviev/ and approve ongoing 
operations, Ov^'ner must submit notice of comple­
tion and, v/ithin five years, proof of restocking. 
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8) PKKALTIliiS AwD "ilNFORCEMi'iliT: Violations are misdemeanors. 
State Forester must make site inspections before, 
during and after operations. He may obtain court 
order to hB,lt operations and require corrections, 
or take action to correct damage himself, expenses 
becoming a lien on the timbered property. 
9) CONVERSION: Only by application. If tract is zoned' 
for timberland, conversion must be in public inter­
est and have no adverse effects on environment. 
Landowner must receive permit from Board, and must 
comply with all harvesting requirements. 
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WA3HIIIGT0N FOREST PRACTICE ACT OP 1974 (as amended, 1975) 
(76.09 R.C.W,) 
1) POLICY: It is in the public interest to manage forest 
lands so as to protect resources and maintain the 
forest industry, and to adopt comprehensive regu­
lations to that effect, 
2) DEFINITIONS: Moderate. 
3) FOREST PRACTICES BOARD: Composed of the heads of the 
Departments of Public Lands, Commerce, Agriculture 
and Ecology, a county official and six members of 
the general public. Pour-year, appointed terms, 
4) DUTIES OP BOARD; Promulgate minimum forest practice 
standards, and water quality standards concurrent 
with Department of Ecology, Public hearings, and 
review by affected agencies and counties, 
5) CLASSIFICATION OP PRACTICES: Class I, practices with 
no significant damage potential need ̂  approval; 
Class II, practices Y/ith low potential for damage, 
written notice is necessary; Class III, other 
practices generally need Departmental approval 
before commencement; Class IV, practices on lands 
undergoing conversion or changes severe enough to 
necessitate EI3, Counties have veto power over 
Departmental approvals. 
6) NOTICE AND APPLICATION; Documents must include type 
of practice proposed, reforestation plan and phy­
siographic data. Long-range plans may cover a series 
of operations. Provisions for changes in operation, 
emergency practices and conversions. 
7) REFORESTATION; Must be successfully established 
within three years under artificial techniques 
or five years if by natural means. 
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STOP WORK ORDER; Department may issue an order to stop 
violation of regulations or divergence from ap­
proved plan. Operators may appeal. 
KOTICii OF VIOLATION: In place of a stop work order, 
the Department may notify operator of violation and 
measures needed to correct damage, if any. 
WATER QUALITY PROTECTIOK: Department of Ecology may 
enforce, through Department of Natural Resources or 
appeals board, v/ater quality regulations. 
DECISIONS; Pinal decision of Department or appeals 
board is binding unless overturned. 
FAILURE TO TAI<E ACTION; If operator fails to correct 
damage, Department may do so and charge costs to 
operator and owner by lien. 
FAILURE TO OBEY STOP WORK ORDER; Department may take 
immediate action to stop operation or avoid damage. 
ACTION TO ENFORCE; Department or county may take 
legal action to enforce regulations. 
INSPECTIONS: Department has right of entry and must 
make inspections before, during and after operation. 
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY: Right of entry to enforce, 
PENALTIES; Violation of law or regulations subject of 
fine. Determination by Department, but may be ap­
pealed. Attorney general may bring legal action. 
DISPOSITION 0? PINES: Pines go to state general fund. 
Monies for reimbursement of damage correction costs 
go directly to Department. 
VIOLATIONS; Gross Misdemeanor. 
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FOREST PRACTICE ADVISORY COITOIITTEE: Appointed by 
Governor, includes educators, agencies, landowners 
and general public. Recommends regulations to 
Board. May .designate from tv/o to five regiona.l 
committees to draft local rules. 
APPEALS BOARD: Three members appointed by Governor, 
of which one must be a lav/yer. 
DUTIES OP APPEALS BOARD; Board may be either full- or 
part-time. Board v/ill make written findings of 
fact for each case heard, 
APPEALS PROCEDURE: Appellant may request formal or 
informal hearing. Board has all powers related to 
due process. De Novo .judicial review available, 
LOCAL GOVERM'.IENT: Local governments prohibited from 
passing forest practice regulations except incidental 
to land use planning, taxation, public health or 
Shoreline Protection Act pov^ers. 
PUBLIC EDUCATION: Board policy to orient and train 
individuals to good forest practices and regtilations, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION; Department may co­
oper-! te with federal government and other states 
in studying forest practices. 
RESEARCH; Department may recommend research needs. 
RIGHT OP ENTRY FOR STREAM MAINTENENCE; Landowners 
must permit agency personnel to enter property 
for piirpose of clearing log jams and debris from 
streams. 
OREGON FOREST PRACTICE ACT (1971) 
(ORS 527.610 to 527.990) 
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1) TITLE: Ore,'-on Forest Practice Act. 
2) DEFINITIONS: Brief. 
3) POLICY: To encourage practices that maintain and 
enhance social and economic benefits, and to avoid 
confusion in the laws and regulations of agencies. 
Board has authority to adopt regional rules for 
sustained yield, protection of forest resources 
and interagency coordination. 
4) FOREST REGIONS: Not less than three. 
5) FOREST PRACTICE COMMITTEES; Advisory in each region. 
Members must be qualified by education/experience. 
At least 2/3 must be ov.ners or operators of forest 
land. Three year terms. 
6) COM/IITTEE DUTIES: Recommends rules and regulations 
appropriate for the region, 
7) NOTICE: Notification of State Forester prior to oper­
ation; he notifies Department of Revenue and county 
assessor. No approval needed for operation. Any 
change in operation requires further notice, 
8) VIOLATION: State Forester will serve citation on 
operator specifying nature of violation and damage. 
The order will direct the operator to cease oper­
ations and repair damage, if possible. Owner or 
operator may appeal. 
9) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER; State Forester may, 
with Board authorization or owner's approval, re­
pair damages and charge costs as lien against the 
operator and/or owner. 
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APPEALS: Ov/ner or operator may appeal to committee of 
the Board and, further, to state circuit court. 
DUTIES OF BOARD: Board must adopt minimum standards 
in each region covering reforestation, road con­
struction, harvesting, chemical use and slash dis­
posal. Provides for intergovernmental cooperation. 
PURPOSE OP RUIdiiS: They shall be designed to meet the 
objectives of forest-related rules of other agencie 
GOMVERSIOU: The law does not preclude conversion. 
PENALTIES; Violation is a misdemeanor. ' Severity of 
penality varies according to section violated. 
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IDAHO FOREST PRACTICE ACT (1974) (38-1301 et seq., I.C.) 
1) TITLE: Ido-ho Forest Practice Act. 
2) POLICY/PURPOSE: To encourage practices on forest land 
which maintain and enhance social and economic ben­
efits; and to frrant the Board of Land Coramisioners 
authority to adopt rules for sustained yield and 
the protection of forest resources. 
3 ) DE FINIT10 N 3; M ode rg, t e. 
4) DUTIES OF Till! BOARD: The Board will adopt regional 
standards for harvesting, road construction, regen­
eration, chemical use and slash disposal, 
5) DUTIES OF DEPAPiTr.TEIlT: Department of Lands will enforce 
the lav/, appoint advisory committees, assist the 
Board, coordinate agencies and assist landowners. 
6) NOTIFICATION OF FOREST PRACTICES: Notice required 
before commencement or changes in opera.tion. No 
approval needed. No notice required if operation 
complies with approved management plan. Notices 
o,re valid for two years, renev/able. 
7) NOTICE OF VIOLATION: Department will make determin­
ation and notify landowner. It may order operator 
to cease and repair damage. Provision for appeal. 
8) REPAIR OF DAMAGE: Department ma.y repa.ir damages and 
charge costs against operator, a,nd ovmer, as author­
ized by the board. 
9) DUTY OF PURCHA3SH: Initial purchas-er must be able to 
furnish proof of operator's notice. 
10) VIOLATIONS; T'isdemeanor. 
11) T;NF0RCL!'j1;NT : Department of Lands is responsible. 
12) COKVE-.'SIOH: The lav; docs not preclude conversion. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE MONTANA EXPERIENCE 
Wontanaiis have tried and failed to enact comprehensive 
forest practice legislation. In 1973» the state Division 
of Forestry sponsered a bill (SB 405)—defeated in 1974» 
The 1975 version (SB 157), made some ch8.nges; it was pri­
marily sponsered by industrial interests, but had broad 
support from other organizations. 
Both environmental and industry groups supported the 
1975 bill, v/hy, then, did it fail? In Oregon and Cali­
fornia, the ba.ttle line for forest practice legislation 
was drawn (and still exists) between these two interests. 
In Montana, the adversity seems to be more between the 
popula.tion in general and certain members of the governing 
17 body. Two in particular, George TlcCallum s,nd Chris Stobie, 
have opposed a law unalterably. And though these two both 
claim to represent the Sanders County population, the evi­
dence and my experience both indicate that resistance from 
that area mas'" result more from their provocation than from 
a democratic groundswell of opinion. 
Our 1973 proposal was modelled closely on Oregon's 
Act. The State Eorester chose to try introducing it in 
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the Senate because, he reasoned, it would encounter more 
resistance there. He was correct. The bill met a hostile 
Natural Resources Committee and lanf^uished until 1974. In 
late 1973, Montana's j:1Q0 endorsed it (Montana, 1973) which 
effect on the legislators was doubtful. The bill was final­
ly defeated on the floor, 29-19, February 6, 1974. 
An historical note from the Division of Forestry (1975) 
listed some of the objections raised to the bill. Legis­
lators felt the enforcement by lien against pronerty was 
too harsh a measure. Also, they said, the identification 
of "scenic values" as a public resource could lead directly 
to conflicts with private property rights, since the term 
does not yet have a precise definition. There was some 
question about the effect of the bill on extant operations, 
though that qtaestion was clarified by amendment during the 
'73 session. Finally, George McCallum worried that his 
Christmas Tree Farm would fall under the Act's auspices. 
The bill as introduced in 1975 was strongly 3.nd pub­
licly supported by industry, conservation, environmental 
and public interest groups. (Moon, 1975^) Changes in the 
bill accomodated every objection raised, though it weakened 
18 
the proposal considerably. No liens or scenic values 
were mentioned, and ongoing operations and Christmas Tree 
farms were exempted. 
Senator Roskie, aDparently a supporter of the bill, 
asked the Division of Forestry for fodder for his floor 
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debate. He asked the Division whether it had a:ny sort of 
incentive proposals to offset the coercive aspects of the 
bill. He felt that if landowners could be compensated for 
their increased coats, it might take some of the sting out 
of regulation. (Moon, 1975a) 
ThoTigh the Division did apparently invent a quick 
study proposal, the bill went down to defeat on March 5th, 
by a vote of 32-17. The vote made it clear, said Gary Moon 
(1975^), that the bill's demise was more a result of "deter­
mined opposition of several small forest practices (sic) 
operators, small forest landov/ners and ranchers" than a 
logical appraisal of the raea^sure. Accomodating every ob­
jection had not made the slightest difference. 
An informal survey by Mark Ahner (1975). for the Div­
ision of Forestry shortly after the Senate's action dis­
closed that resistance was, indeed, small but vocal. Of 
several groups that he visited, only the Flathead Christmas 
Tree Growers Association was violently opposed to the bill 
— not surprising since George McCallum is its president. 
But all other groups, including Lions Clubs, the Lincoln 
County Committee for Rural Development and the V/estern 
Montana Loggers Association all believed in the proposal 
as a benefit to Montana and Montanans. Even county com-
misioners in Y/estern Montana were quoted as supporting the 
"concept," though preferring incentive-based approaches, 
(intermountain Logging News, 1974) 
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The proposal at this writing is not dead; its sponsers 
are waiting for an opportune time to make a third attempt. 
But it remains to "be seen, what manner of legislation will 
satisfy the illogica.1 opposition of a determined few v/ith 
the balancc of power and yet effectively serve the needs of 
the indiAstry, the public and the resource. Possibly, state 
law is not the answer in Montana, 
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A BILL RELATING TO FOREST PRACTICES (SB 157, 44th Session) 
1) TITLE: Montana Forest Practice Act (1975). 
2) POLICY/PIJHPOSE; To encourage forest practices which 
maintain social and economic benefits and resources. 
Board granted authority to adopt rules for sustained 
yield and the protection of forest resources, 
3) DEPIKITIOKS: Minimal. 
4) DUTIES OF BOARD: Board must adopt regional rules 
governing harvesting, road construction, refor­
estation, chemical use and slash disposal, 
5) POWERS AND DUTIES OF DEPARTl'lENT; Department will 
appoint an advisory coimcil and enforce the act. 
6) NOTICE: Operator must notify Department before com­
mencement of operation. No approval needed. A 
single, annual notice may be substituted. 
7) DUTY OF PURCHASER: Commercial purchaser must be able 
to furnish proof of notice by operator, 
8) VIOLATION: Department may order operator to cease 
violating practice or operation. Provision for 
appeal. Operators may continue non-violating action, 
9) MISDEMEANOR: Failure to file notice or comply v^ith 
Departmental rules. Indictment by Department, 
10) LEGAL ASSISTANCE: Available to Department from state, 
11) PEACE OFFICERS: Departmental authority, 
12) CONVERSION: Conversion to other uses must be done 
v/ithin time normally required for reforestation. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE LOCAL CONTROL ALTERNATIVE 
In the 1940's, one author wrote that "local super­
vision" is best; the supervisors are more closely in touch 
with the problem and can better grasp, and work to achieve, 
the goals we set. (Recknagel, 1945) He was referring to 
a preference for state law over federal. Thirty years 
later, vie are using the same reasoning to go one step fur­
ther—to the coimty level. The general purpose government 
iq 
a,nd the conservation districts are prime candidates. 
County planning 
County level land use planning is not a new concept. 
In 1935» almost 300 county planning commissions existed in 
the TJ,3, In 1938, the Department of Agriculture began a 
"grassroots system of planning'," hoping to bring av/areness 
and a sense of participation to local citizens. 
The program mushroomed until, by 1941, almost 2/3 of 
all the agricultural coiinties in the nation had locally-
sponsered planning committees. These committees were 
charged v;ith gathering information, classifying resources 
and preparing plans to solve the specific problems of their 
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county. The program 
focused attention on the merits of community 
self-evalu.ation and . . , local remedial section 
programs. . . and resulted in the better inte­
gration of several state and federal programs 
at the local level. 20/ 
In that year, though, the federal government v/ithdrew 
its support, claiming lack of-local commitment. Some of 
the committees survived, most faded away. Only where the 
local citizens felt a need, instead of having it suggested 
to them from above, was the program a continuing success. 
(Barlov/e, 1953) 
Montana county governments have never, to my knowledge, 
expressed a desire to asstwne the responsibility for admin­
istering a forest practice program. Most county govern­
ments in Montana are part-time affairs; they have neither 
the expertise to administer a policy themselves nor the 
time or money to delegate that responsibility to others. 
Furthermore, counties in Wfontana have no legislative power. 
Though the commissioners form a coiinty legislature in name, 
they have no pov/er to make lavv' until and imless approved 
by the state. 
The new (1973) Constitution and House Bill 110^^ might 
have changed that. Counties could have assumed self-govern-
ment pov/ers through the voter review process. But only a 
small handful even attempted it so far. As it stands, no, 
county has full powers of law-making yet. 
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In short, counties have neither the pov.'er nor the 
expertise to implement and administer a forest practice 
policy. The future may hold a different story; expanded 
financial fitness and authority could put Montana counties 
in the spotlight. But at present, they are dead ends. 
Soil conservation districts 
About the same time county planning was tried, the 
federal government experimented v.dth another approach to 
local involvement. In 1937, the Department of Agriculture 
proposed a model state Soil Conservation Districts Law. 
Conservation districts would be an autonomous branch of 
state government, electing their own officers from local 
landowners and having certain pov/ers to guide — by per-
suation and regulation — the use of land. 
In 1952, fifteen years later, 2,300 districts were in 
existance. Most v/ere given power to enact land use ordin­
ances, but only fifteen had passed any. 
There has been no rush on the part of the 
districts to adopt land use ordinances. Major 
emphasis has thus far been placed on voluntary 
measures to foster soil conservation. But the 
existance of authority . . . suggests , . . 
possibilities for the expanded use of regula­
tions of this type in the direction of land 
resotirce use practices in the future. 22/ 
The opportunity to use this pov/er to guide agricultural, 
forest and construction practices in Montana is becoming 
apparent. 
Montana enacted its Soil Conservation Districts Law 
in 1939 (Title 76, R.C.M. 1947). The law gave the power 
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of ordinance-making to the districts in section 76-109. No 
district has yet exercised this por/er. V/ith the passage of 
PVVPCA, and its mandate to eliminate nonpoint pollution, sev­
eral resea,rchers have noted that conservation districts 
have ujitapped potential, "Since erosion , , . is the lead­
ing soixrce of nonpoint pollution, this [ordinance-making^ 
2 ̂ authority could be vital." 
Are the districts ready to pick up the ba.ll? In a 
recent survey, district supervisors responded that there 
were already too many laws, too much bureaucracy and con­
fusion and infringements of rights, and a lack of cooper­
ation, All but eight of the 39 said that local government 
is the best level for land use administration, (Montana, 1974b) 
In 1974, the legislature defeated a proposed .Sediment 
Control Law (SB 401) which would have set up local sediment 
control programs along lines similar to the Streambed 
Protection Act of 1975 (26-4710 et seq, R.C.M. 1947). 
(Johnson, 1977a, Montana DKHO, 1975) Instead, SJR 52 v/as 
approved, establishing a study of alternatives in statev/ide 
sediment control. A committee of the DNRC reported in 1975 
that it had chosen to experiment with "local administration" 
of sediment control and had applied to EPA for a grant to 
test it, (Montana I)KRC, 1975) 
EPA responded with a S145»000 grant for a "first in 
±hp. yiQt.-iDTi" nttfimpt at letting the conservation districts 
take the lead, Lewis and Clark County Conservation District 
was selected from among volunteers to develop a pilot or­
dinance, primarily because of its agricultural and physio­
graphic diversity. In its second report to the legislature 
in April, 1977, the DNRC committee reported that 
approval of Lewis and Clark CD's Sediment Control 
Ordinance may influence the course of , . , 
planning a^r^encies by demonstrating that conservation 
districts are ready and willing to accept the re­
sponsibility of . . . their own programs. 24/ 
The ordinance, developed by an intergovernmental staff, 
is worthy of study. It proposes to comply with the intent 
of FvVPCA and to follow the recommendation that conservation 
districts assume sediment control responsibility. And, 
though its primary purpose is control of erosion, it does 
8.11 that a state forest practices act would do. 
Proponents claim that the ordinance, if. approved, will 
mean the chance for local residents to have control over a 
federal mandate. It will provide a standard for operators 
to live up to and give authority the the district to deal 
with violators of that standard. But above all it will 
"not dictate land use to the landowner, but is designed 
to help protect l8,nd occupiers within the district from 
2^ damage caused by accelerated soil erosion." 
Fate of the ordinance ' 
Will the proposal pass? Even the staff that drafted 
it has no ansv.-er beyond optimism. (Johnson, 1977b) The 
principal opposition, as expected, comes from the right-
wing groups who question the Gonstitutiona.lity of any land 
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use planning and particularly the FtVPCA. The drafters* 
judgment is that the ordinance will have a harder time of 
passage in Levi/is and Clark County than elsewhere. If it 
does pass, they speculate that it v?ill be easily and rapid­
ly adopted tay other districts. 
The staff plans to carry out an intensive education 
and information program, with interviews and ads in the 
local media, bumper stickers, leaflets and even litter 
bags. They believe that, even if the propaganda effort 
fails to carry the vote, it v/ill at least serve a purpose 
in making the people aware of the existence and purpose 
of conservation districts. 
All other districts, says Bill Johnson of the staff, 
are watching and v^aiting to see how the proposal fares. 
If it does not pass, the next legislative session will make 
sediment control regulation mandatory, he thinks, either 
by statewide legislation or amendment of the Conservation 
Districts Lav; to require Sediment Control Ordinances. In 
effect, if landowners fail to take this chance, regulation 
will be imposed on them whether they like it or not. 
The attempt, Johnson claims, is to let the problems 
be solved by neighbors instead of the government. But 
2 6 
will conservation districts do this effectively? Indiv­
idual district ordinances would, besides adding administra-
cnat^s ̂ require manpower for preparing conservation 
plans, approving forest operations and providing expertise 
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where the local districts fall short, e.g. in soil analysis, 
fisheries and disease control. The estimate is that, even 
ascuming that all 59 districts pass ordinances — that no 
gaps exist — the costs of manpower to the Divi^iion of 
Forestry would double, compared to statev;ide administration, 
and overall costs would increase 2-| times. (Lukes, 1977b) 
If local control becomes a viable and effective means of 
involving and edvicating local landowners in the maintenence 
and use of their forest land resource, the costs will be 
worth the effort. 
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LEWIS AMD CL/IRK COUNTY CONSERVATION DISTRICT SEDIMENT 
CONTROL ORDINANCE (#77-01 as proposed 4-15-77) 
1) TITLE: Lewis and Clark ('ounty Conservation District 
Sediment Control Ordinance, as aiithorized by 
I.'Iontrana law. 
2) POLICY: Control and prevent accelerated soil erosion. 
3) PIJjJPOuE; A comprehensive program villi use land up to 
its capabilities, prevent degradation of resources 
and oromote the general welfare. 
4) DEPIHITIONS: Uoderate. 
. 5) CONS..RVATION STANDARDS: Minimum standards shall be 
those set by the SCS for erosion control and the 
State Forestry Committee for timber harvesting, but 
nay be repealed or amended by the svipervisors, 
6) AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES; (not applicable) 
7) FORESTRY ACTIVITIES; Any land occupier operating in 
accordance with district-approved v/oodlot conserva­
tion plan complies with regulations. Those without 
plan must submit notice of proposed operations to 
the district, whose supervisors may require review 
of the proposal by a team. Team will make on-site 
inspection to determine whether plan is necessary. 
8) CONSTRUCTION/SUBDIVISION ACTIVITIES; (not applicable) 
9) EMERGENCY L.IND MANAGEHENT ACTIVITIES; Practices in 
response to natural emergencies heed no prior ap­
proval. Five days allowed for notice. 
10) COMPLAINTS; Land occtipiers, the supervisors or gov­
ernment officials may file complaint alleging 
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ACTION INITIATED BY COHPLAINTrf: Supervisors determine 
by investigation with land occupier and complainant 
whether violation actually exists. If so, the 
supervisors and violator will try to work out vol-
untarj)' corrective measures. 
BOARD 0? ADJlJyTr'IljWT: Three member Board of Adjustment 
(appeals board) appointed by DIIRG. 
APPEAL TO BOARD OP ADJUSTMENT: Land occupiers may 
appeal decision of supervisors to the board, which 
has authority to grant variances. The supervisors 
may appeal a board decision to district court. 
ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST OPERATIONS: Supervisors 
may issue order to violators to cea,se operations, 
COMPLIANCE vriTII OTIGiR LAWS: Approval by district 
• V does not preclude compliance with other laws, 
PENALTY: Misdemeanor, punishable by fine, 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: Because of additional costs 
imposed on land occupier by good conservation prac­
tices, district supervisors may assist him in 
finding public funding. Lack of ava.ilable fimds 
is possible justification for variance. 
LIABILITY: Approval of plan does not remove land 
occupier from liability nor place liability on 
district for subsequent damage to private propertj''. 
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Notes: 
1. This is an argwAent favoring federal over state, too. 
2. Most federal proposals, such as the draft bill, now 
focus on the federal government as a source of assis­
tance rather than control. Albeit, one commentator 
has proposed a federal forest practice act with reg­
ulations by Ex'A. and mandatory state compliance. 
(Johnson, 1975) 
3. Some counties had forest practice controls as early 
as 1937. But in 1956, the Attorney General rialed 
that the power to regulate forest practices, except 
for fire control, rested exclusively with the state. 
And a 1957 amendment to the Act made it official. 
In 1970, the Act was amended to give three counties 
regulatory power. The nev/ law now gives- all counties 
this power (s.45l6). (Arvola, 1970) 
4. "Much has been made of the considerable land use 
planning authority that has been quiet'ly amassed by 
. . . EPA. National laws governing air quality, 
water quality, solid waste disposal, noise pollution 
and transportation have authorized broad powers over 
land uses." Healy, 1976. P. 148-9. 
5. One other provision of FiVPCA narrowly avoided affecting 
forest management. Section 404 of the Act gave the 
Corps of Engineers authority to regulate by permit 
"the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigible waters at specified disposal sites." Sub­
sequent Gort)S regulations excluded forest management 
activities (except some aspects of road building) 
from the permit process. The National Forest Products 
Association relievedly stated that a permit program 
would ha.ve discouraged forestry. (NPPA, 1975) 
6. Agee, 1973. P. 41. 
7. The state suffered bad damage to timberlands in two 
major floods in the early 60's. Some blamed poor 
forest practices. The agitation for a Redwood National 
Park increased and rode the swell of the environmental 
movement in the late 60's. And local govermnents were 
lobbying for more power, (see note 3» above) 
8. The Ba?/"side Timber case, see p. 28. 
9. In the Eastern District, operators could not cut 
Ponderosa.pine (P, ponderosa) under 16 inches in 
diameter. Operators, by lav/, had to post a ^24 bond 
to ensure regeneration within five years. (PAPTE, 1973) 
io". Siegarr^^974. P. 210. 
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11. The Act v?as passed in 1974 and added to in 1975. 
12. Schroeder, 1972, P. 3. 
13. Forest practice regulations require multi-af^ency in­
spections of some operations, but instances have de­
creased steadily since 1972 — attributed to increased 
expertise in the State Forester's office, (Oregon, 1977) 
14. Tlie bill, introduced at the request of Forestry for 
Oregon's Tomorrow, apparently is aimed at reducing 
perceived industry domination of forest policy. But 
some question v.'hether this theory is wise or even 
valid. (Oregon C. of G., 1977b) As one commentator 
pointed out, v/hy shouldn't persons with a direct in­
terest be on the boards, when the policy they make 
8,ffects their own (private) lands? (Klemperer, 1971) 
15. The law did not specifically require inspections. 
16. The 1937 legislation applied to all areas over five 
acres in size and imposed a $50 fine for each acre 
left y/ithout seed trees. (PAPTE, 1973) 
17. Of Wiarada and Thompson Falls, respectively. The 
latter y/as not elected until last year, but had been 
quite vocal before, 
18. The proposal also would have amended our Hazard Reduc­
tion Law, by correcting antiquated and conflicting 
language and shifting responsibility for slash disposal 
from the State to the operator. Because of the bill, 
increased public awareness of the problem resulted in 
the rev/riting of the law, 
19. An EQC survey of these two groups showed an overwhelming 
concern for preservation of the agricultural land base. 
' Only 11 of 39 supervisors failed to mark it number one. 
Many in both groups expressed frustration with upper 
level red tape; many purposely failed to enforce laws 
and regulations for this reason.. (Montana, 1974a) 
20. Barlowe, 1953, P. 477, 
21. HB 110, 811 pages before amendments, would have re­
built the local government code of R.C.M, One of its 
effects would have been to liberalize county legisla­
tive powers. The bill died an agonizing death. 
22. Barlowe, 1958, p. 513. 
23. Montana, 1972. P. 137. 
24. Montana, 1977. P. 9. 
25. from the Introduction accompanying the proposal. 
26. State officials are divided on the question. (Bergmeier) 
PAE'I III 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Each of the a.cts or proposals that I reviewed in Part 
II has individually unique features to cope with the special 
problems it addresses. Since this study is concerned with 
the appropriateness of a law for Montana, the purpose of 
Part III is to focus on these alternatives, and their ac-
cepta,bility in the l;:ontana milieu, 
study shows that all the proposals except the 
Conservation Bistrict' s Ordina.nce fall into two general 
catef^ories. "California Glass" laws^ are generally more 
explicit: California's, V/ashinfrton* s and the EPA model. 
"Orefron Class" la'.vs are not as restrictive: Oregon's, 
Idaho's and Montana's bill. But each offering has major 
and minor variations of its own. 
To let the reader compare for himself the alterna­
tives, I will present a tabularized outline of the options 
in each provision. Recommendations are included, also, as 
to which, if any, alternative fits the political and eco-
logical climate in T.Tontana. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PURPOSE, DEFINITIONS 
EPA' s 
Model 
Comprehensive; includes consideration of 
every conceivable resource and benefit. 
Creates a comprehensive regulatory system. 
CALIFORNIA'S 
Law 
Extensive consideration of all forest 
resources while maintaining timber pro­
ductivity. 
WASHINGTON's 
Law 
Viable timber industry must be compatible 
v/ith sound natural resource management. 
Need for system of regulation to do so. 
OREGON • s 
Law 
Encourage forest practices that enhance 
social, economic benefits v/hile assuring 
continuous growing and harvesting of trees. 
IDAHO•s 
Law 
Encourage forest practices that enhance 
social, economic benefits while assuring 
continuous growing and harvesting of trees. 
MONTANA's 
1975 Bill 
Encourage forest practices that enhance 
social, economic benefits while assuring 
continuous growing and harvesting of trees. 
LEWIS & CLARK 
CD Ordinance 
Create a program to conserve soil and 
water resources and prevent accelerated 
soil erosion. 
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A statement of policy is the guide to any lav/. It 
sets forth the motivations of the state and the standards 
for the rest of the lav^' meet. It is the necessary first 
step to lav/-buildinc;. It should, in fact, he v/ell in mind 
before the rest of the law is even conceived. The law is 
the attack on the problem; the statement of policy is the 
definition and limitation of the problem, 
V/hat should be set oiit in a forest practice statement 
of policy? It depends to a great extent on our use of the 
forest resource. Timber productivity and the maintenence 
of air and water quality are items that should always ap­
pear, Soil protection, recreational use, aesthetics and 
2 scientific values are suggested at times, too, (Francois, 
1950; SAP, 1975) 
The inclusion of scenic/aesthetic resources, in par­
ticular, has been a point of controversy in much legislation. 
In Oregon, the aesthetics provision was struck from the 
list for political reasons, (Mattock, 1977) In Wontana, 
"aesthetics" provoked the response that a purely subjective 
criterion could and should not appear among the objects 
of rule-making, (Montana, 1975a) 
The policy statement should also reflect the objectives 
of the agency which will administer the law. The policy 
of Montana's division of Forestry seems to be to encourage 
the production of timber on all suitable lands to the ex-
tent that it does not harm the environment. In this case, 
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a po3_icy statement should orient the non-market resource 
values only in their relation to growing timber. 
The Lewis and Clark Sediment Control Ordinance (here­
after referred to as "CD ordinance") has a different per­
spective, The orientation of its policy statement is 
tov/ard soil protection, not timber production. 
The EPA model reads as follov/s; 
The legislature thus declares that it is the 
policy of this state to encourage prudent and re­
sponsible forest management calculated to serve 
the public's need for timber and other forest pro­
ducts, protection of v.'ater quality and quantity, 
Vv'atershed protection, protection of soils, air, 
recreational opportunities, fisheries and wildlife, 
• • • 
It is the purpose of this act to create and 
maintain a comprehensive system of regulation and 
use of all timberlands so as to assure that where 
feasible the productivity of timberlands is re­
stored, enhanced and maintained and to assure that 
water quality and quantity, soils, watersheds, air, 
recreational opportunities, wildlife and fisheries 
are protected. 
It is further the purpose of this act to achieve 
complia-nce v/ith all applicable requirements of fed­
eral and state laws v/ith respect to nonpoint sources 
of pollution from forest practices. 
The section states that the legislature endorses timber 
production only subject to the constraints of resource pro­
tection. The list is long, and a little repetitive, b^^t 
EPA favors the "clean, comprehensive statement of policy 
over condensed versions."^ A Montana adaption of EPA's 
policy statement would stress the economic value of timber 
more, and other resources less. 
California Class lav/s, such as EPA's, read much the 
same, ./anhington' s reads: 
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It is in the public interest for public and 
private commercial forest landr; to be managed con-
sistant with sound policies of natural resource 
protection; that coincident with the ma.intenence 
of a viable forest products industry, it is im­
portant to afford protection to forest soils, 
fisheries, wildlife, v/ater quantity and quality, 
air quality, recrea/bion and scenic beauty. 
The statements of the Oregon Class lav/s are also sim­
ilar to each ot}ier. Idaho's, for example, reads: 
Recognizing that state and private forest 
lands make a vital contrib-ation to Idaho by pro­
viding jobs, products, tax base, and other social 
and economic benefits ... it is the public pol­
icy of this state to encourage forest practices 
on these lands which m.aintain and enhance those 
benefits. 
. . .  i t  i s  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  t o  v e s t  
in the Board of Land Commissioners aiithority to 
adopt rules designed to assure the continuous growing 
and harvesting of forest tree species and to protect 
a,nd maintain the forest . . . resources. 
Oregon's adds the provision that it is "essential to avoid 
uncertainty and confusion" in implementing forest laws 
between and among agencies, and that coordination is a goal. 
The CD Ordinance, after setting out a sim.ple policy 
to "provide for the conservation of soil and water resources" 
states its purpose as follows; 
It is the purpose of this ordinance to enact 
a . . . program . . . and thereby (a) use the land 
in accordance v;ith its capabilities and treat it 
according to its needs; (b) prevent degradation of 
lands, streams, reservoirs, and la,kes; and (c) pro­
tect and promote the health, safety, environment 
and general v/elfare of the people. 
There is one essential difference in wording between 
laws; the California C las pro pose "an effective and 
comprehensive system of regulation and use" v/hile the 
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Oregon Class laws specifically delegate "authority to adopt 
rules" to their respective administrative structures. The 
conservation district, of course, cannot delegate author­
ity — they are at the bottom of the pecking order. 
REG OMT,'END AT ION: 
. My reviev/ of the established options shows that nearly 
all of them place timber production first, and make it 
subject to varj/'ing constraint. A Montana law would not 
only do this, emphasizing the economic benefit of timber, 
but would go further in stating that private citizens h;ave 
a right and duty to manage lands as they see fit, albeit 
letting professionals (the state) demonstrate hov/ to get 
the most out of management, resoi-xrce-wise. A policy state­
ment might also include Oregon's goal of simplifying and 
minimizing bureaucracy. 
Definitions 
Every law provides definitions of the terras used in 
order to clarify language or assign responsibility (e.g. 
"Board," "agency"). Most forest practice laws agree on 
basic definitions such as "landowner" and "timber oper­
ator." The CT) Ordinance adds a new dimension by defining 
la.nd occupier in place of landowner: 
. . . any person, firm, corporation, munici­
pality, or other legal entity who shall hold title 
to, or shall be in possession of, any lands lying 
within the conservation district, whether as owner, 
lessee, renter, tenant,  n r  otherwise ̂ t h e „  t e r m —  
shall include both the ovmer and occupier of the 
land when they are not the same. 
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California and Oregon "Class laws differ slightly over 
the term "forest land." Oregon defines it as "land for 
which a primary use is growing trees," California includes 
land "capable of" growing trees for which another use is 
not already present. The latter terra v/ould seem more ap­
propriate except that few forest practices could be con­
ducted on land that is not actively growing trees. The 
definition of forest land should also include the extent 
of lands covered, viz. state, federal or indian. 
Perhaps the most important term to specify is "forest 
practice." Host definitions list road-building, harvesting, 
reforestation, use of chemicals and slash disposal. (Lukes, 
1977a; V/FCA, 1975) Montana's, for example; 
Forest practice means 
(a) the harvesting of forest tree species; 
(b) road construction which requires the cutting 
or removal of forest tree species; 
(c) reforestation; 
(d) the use of chemicals or fertilizer . . . 
(e) the disposal of slashings. 
A list such as this is very easy for administration; 
one can classify practices by vAether or not they fall into 
these categories. Were it not for administrative problems, 
though, ve could do better to define forest practices 
ecologically rather than generically. 
RECOImviEFDATION: 
Forest practices shall include all activities on forest 
In-nd whinh have pfitentia.1 for a 1 terntioja—0--^--l,and or 
resources. 
CHAPTER TEN 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
EPA's 
Model 
State forest practice Board appointed 
from general public, authority to make 
regional rules and hear appeals. 
CALIFORNIA's 
Law 
State Board of forestry, with district 
advisory committees appointed from speci­
fied areas of expertise. 
WASHINGTON•s 
Law 
State forest practice board composed of 
government officials and general public. 
Appointed statewide advisory committee. 
OREGON • s 
Law 
State Board of forestry, with regional 
advisory committees made up of appointed 
landowners and general public. 
IDAHO's 
Law 
Board of Land Commissioners, with state 
advisory committee equally represented by 
North and South districts. 
MONTANA•s 
1975 Bill 
Board of Natural Resources, with state 
advisory committee equally represented by 
East and West Districts. 
LEWIS & CLARK 
CD Ordinance 
District supervisors may amend basic regu­
lations of the SCS and state forestry 
committee previously in effect. 
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Forest practice laws must provide for a structure of 
administration and rule-making unless rules are Written 
into the law. But any one of a number of administrative 
striictures is possible. Who is responsible for setting the 
standards, and the procedure they use,.is an important 
consideration. They may be set by the legislature, by an 
agency or by a professional/citizen board. They may cover 
the entire state or be very localized. Several factors 
influence the choice: the status quo, popular attitudes 
and economics. 
Administrative body 
There seems to be consensus in the existing laws that 
a single entity must make policy decisions, such as a board, 
and an agency must enforce them. In setting- policy, there 
is a certain mix of technical knov;ledge and public opinion 
which will produce politically and environmentally sound 
decisions. 
An agency has the ideal concentration of professional 
personnel to make technical decisions. If standards were 
to be set by purely technical criteria, one would prefer 
assigning the job to the agency. But a single agency often 
lacks the diversity of expertise required. Ilor does it 
have an institutionalized means of weighing the force of 
public opinion. The limited professional and political 
scope of the p..gency may_diitar-it- from reaching a policy 
which is best suited for the political and ecological times. 
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A citizen bo8,rd is more visible and accountable. If 
v.e are to set standards v^hich are not purely technical but 
reflect the popular will, then we mtist involve the public. 
Public input can be either formal, through representation 
on the board, or informal, through public hearings and 
solicitations, 
The best option is to create a body with just the 
right proportion of expertise and public opinion repre­
sented. But the laiws and sources I have studied differ 
on just what that right proportion is, 
EPA's proposal reads: 
members . . . shall be selected and approved on • 
the basis of their e'duca-tional and professional 
qualifications . . . [Thej^ shall be selected from 
the general public and represent the general in­
terest. , . At no time shall a majority of the 
members be persons with a direct financial interest 
in timberlands. 
But commentators on earlier drafts favored strong represen­
tation by government officials and industry on the board, 
(liPA, 1975) The SAP Task Force recommended that, while a 
board should represent the general public interest, it 
should reflect a "majority of expertise," (SAF, 1975) 
Bruce T.Tonell of Washington advocates a board with a 
broad spectrum of interests and expertise. His state's 
law reads; 
(1) There is hereby created the forest practice 
board of the state of Washington as an agency of 
state fTOvernment cnnsi nting__frE^rflembEt^5-a^ followo 
(a) the, commisioner of public lands ... 
(b) the director of the department of commerce and 
economic development . . . 
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(c) the director of the department of agriculture, 
(d) the director of the depp.rtment of ecology, 
(e) an elected member of a county legislative 
authority appointed by the governor . , . 
(f) six members of the general public appointed 
by the governor, one of v^hom shall be an 
owner of not more than five hundred acres 
of forest land and one of whom shall be 
an independent logging contractor. 
There are five represent8,tives of government interests on 
the board. And it is conceivable that the forestry pro­
fession might not be represented, 
Tslontana's proposal gives the DNRG the authority to 
appoint a seven member advisory council to the Board of 
Natural Resources^ qualified only by "experience or, edu­
cation to provide advice related to forest practices," 
California sets strict limitations on members of advisory 
committees: 
At no time shall a majority of the members, 
nor any of the members selected from the general 
public, be persons with a direct personal finan­
cial interest. 
In Oregon, the legislature is questioning its system. 
Though the law now reads "six members shall be chosen from 
persons actively and principally engaged" in the forest, 
products industry, (526,010) HB 2997''^ v;ould amend that 
to read "not more than four of the voting members shall 
have an economic interest in the -orimary wood products 
industry," removing a voting majority from the state board. 
The bill would also change the composition of local boards, 
froTnr^h¥~currgnir~"Trt&^^L»&&-t;han^/'^ jof the nine member 
committee! shall be private landowners," to "not more than 
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three . . . shall have an economic interest."^ Current 
status of the "bill is unavailable, 
REC0M,TEMDATI0W ; 
The chief opposition to forest practice legislation 
in Montana comes from small landovmers and timber oper­
ators. They protest that the government is without jus­
tification appropriating their property rights. It is 
logical to conclude that a board or advisory committee 
composed of local landowners would be more responsive, but 
also more sympathetic, to the needs of this group. 
The present Board of Natural Resources, though billed 
as a citizen board, is just as far av/ay from the average 
citizen as the State Forester. Members of an administra­
tive board should be visible and responsive to the commun­
ity. Local officials, such as representatives of the 
conservation districts, would serve this ptirpose. 
Finally, I recommend that a state official be chairman, 
if only on accotint of his acqiAaintance with bureaucracy and 
red tape at the state level. 
Local boards 
Most forest practice boards (or those that serve the 
purpose) are appointed by and responsible to the governor. 
In this manner, says Ayer (1973), the "ultimate responsi­
bility" rests on a public, appointive board and the whole 
state's interests are represented. But policy makers a^ree 
that rules cannot be made and applied statewide in all 
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cases. Because of geographical, biological and political 
reasons, the state must be divided into regions. These 
divisions serve two functions: they bring local problems 
into perspective, and they allovi^ rules to address areas 
of ecological similarity, 
EPA's model, fdr example, reads: 
Insofar as possible, the board shall group to­
gether lands that have substantially similar 
characteristics and that will best be served 
by substantially similar regulations. 
Advisory committees are usually established in each 
district, as in California and Oregon. In Montana, one 
advisory committee would have been composed of "seven mem-?' 
bers, three residing in the V/est forest region and three 
residing in the Blast forest region, [one at large^" Montana's 
setup was evidently an att empt to reduce the potential for 
added bureaucracy. 
The CD Ordinance gives rule-making pov;er to the local 
board of supervisors. This act v;ould reinforce a local 
bureaucracy and work against the goal of smaller govern­
ment. But government would be smaller in another sense; 
it would be more visible to the people, 
HECOMMENijATION; 
V'e are faced with a tradeoff. Would we prefer the 
added administrative costs of many, smaller governmental 
entities or the possible mistreatment of local concerns by 
a larger on^ Th^re ai^^T)eneTTts to both alternatives. 
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Regional administration 
The ideal means of regulating forest practices, 
a.ccording to Elemperer (1971), is on an acre-by-acre 
basis. But the costs are prohibitive. The alternatives 
are statewide regulation or regional regulation. If 
regulation were imposed over the whole state, it would 
be detrimental both politically and ecologically. The 
state should be broken down into regions for rule-making 
and other administrative purposes. Ideally, .these regions 
would be based on ecological similarity. 
Can regions in Montana be established on this criteria? 
Montana's proposed la,w would have created two regions: east 
of the divide and west of the divide. But most of our land 
area is east and most of our forest west, A plan of this 
sort, though less costly, is also too broad for Montana, 
The EQC ha,s divided the state into ecological regions 
for analysis and planning purposes. The most important 
forested regions are the Columbia Rockies, the Yellowstone 
Rockies, the Broad Valley Rockies and the Rocky Mountain 
Foreland, These regions v/ould meet the criterion of eco­
logical similarity. And only four individual sets of reg­
ulations would be required. But there is a fatal flaw. 
These regions do not correspond to political boundaries. 
Their creation would involve a whole new level of admin­
istration, with associated problems. In possible anti­
cipation, the LQO, in its Fourth Annual Heport, states 
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that these are only environmental regions and are by no 
means to be considered 'new state districts. (l^ontana, 1975) 
There is another alternative. \Ve now have in Montana 
twelve multi-county districts. These districts v.-cre es­
tablished by the .^^overnor to facilitate reiHiional admin­
istration. Re'^'-ional programs as well as the Councils of 
Government (GOGs) utilize these districts. District 
bound8,ries are drawn along county lines, but at the same 
time group together areas of similar physiography. Roughly 
five of them would suffice the states main timber country. 
However, the Division of Forestry is not set up for these 
districts; to them, it would still be a whole new system. 
The final alternative is the use of the conservation 
districts — purely local administration. Local boards 
have a history of participating in land use decisions, 
Siegal (1974) endorses the concept, saying that in general, 
local regulations developed by local boards for local 
conditions have v;orked the best. However, one ans.lysis 
of New York State's statute concluded that the program 
there hs.d lost its dyng.mism partly because of local apathy, 
(Harnilton, 1963) 
The Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 
(26-1510) gave the conservation districts authority to 
administer regi,ilations governing that aspect of land use. 
Some districts took some initiative; others simply adopted 
the minimums prescribed by DImRC , In most districts. 
administration of the act nearly tripled the workload, 
(Johnson, 1977b) If districts were to adopt the proposed 
sediment control ordinance, their administrative str^^ctures 
— and costs — vould expand considerably. 
In a survey of land use issues conducted in 1974, at 
least seven of the districts responding cited their lack of 
knowledf;;e and qualifications to deal with current issues. 
But they were conscious of them and prepared to do sorae-
thinjr;. Several respondents offered suggestions for nev/ 
programs to protect special resources. One district wanted 
new regulations that would nrotect the rights of ovnership 
and at the same time society's interest for future gener­
ations. The same district proposed th8,t regulation begin 
with local initiative, arid that the superior financial and 
organizational reso^irces of the state could then be mar­
shalled against locally identified problems, (Montana, 
1974a) This indicates a. certain amount of political savvy, 
RECOMliKNDATION; 
"J3istrict-level a.dministration is closest to the pro­
blem, But districts often lack the time, money and re­
sources to ta,ke the lead. And when they do, it is often 
with a distinct loca.1 bias. But local rule-making is a 
politically sound move. One alternative might be to es­
tablish local rules, but enable the right of review by a 
statev/ide entity such as the Board of Natural Resources, 
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'•any of- the older laws, since rewritten, set standards 
in the legislature. This is still the case to some extent 
in California, where legislated rules are disguised under 
the term "resource conservation standards." 
Amidst the rising clamor of concern about the lack of 
openness and accountability in the administrative branch, 
legislative standards gain some credence. Administrative 
rule-making, it is claimed, is unjust because it subverts 
the rule of law; it places the decisions of one man or a 
few men beyond the reach of the people. The apparent sol­
ution is to set our standards in the ha^lls of the legis-
l8,ture, where everybody ha.s a cha.nce to participate, 
Legisls.tors are responsive to public demands. But they 
are hardly qualified to m.ake forest practice policy. Some 
are barbers, some teachers, some pharmacists. They deal 
with land use issues, business regulation, taxes and inter­
state commerce. They cannot take the time — even if they 
had it — to become even routinely knowledgable about 
forestry issues. 
Regulation established by law is less flexible than 
that created administra,tively. New technologies and ap­
proaches come into being faster than a legislature can 
amend its rules. One good example is that of t]ae National 
Forest Organic Act of 1397, out of date long before 
Congress even became aware of the problem. 
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Rules established by the legislature would tend to be 
more politically sound. They would reflect the will of the 
people to the extent that the legislature does.. But the 
politics of the legislature simply preclude a technically 
sound decision, 8,s well. The proper function of the legis­
lature, says the SAP Task Force (1975), is in establishing 
procedures and guidlines for regulations, not in writing 
them into the law, 
REC0I;?:ERDATI0N: 
Montana's Legisla.ture, particuLarly restricted by time 
and staffing limitations, should not retain the responsi­
bility for setting and updating forest practice rules. 
But it should keep a clearly established oversight re­
sponsibility over actions and pronouncements of state ad­
ministrators, This need not be written into a forest prac­
tice law; it should be implied in every delegation of 
power. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
RULE-MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 
EPA's 
Model 
Plan required for large operations, notice 
only for small. Inspections as necessary. 
Board may allow state to repair damage. 
CALIFORNIA'S 
Law 
Professionally prepared plan required. 
Inspections before, during and after. 
Court order to stop violators and repair. 
WASHINGTON's 
Law 
Plan/notice/EIS varying according to poten­
tial for damage. Inspections before, during 
and after. Stop work order, may make repairs. 
OREGON•s 
Law 
Notice of operation required. Stop work 
order for violators. Board may allow 
department to repair damages. 
IDAHO•s 
Law 
Notification or management plan required. 
Department may issue stop work order and 
repair damages. 
MONTANA•s 
1975 Bill 
Notice of operation required. Department 
may issue stop work order and repair dam­
ages on its own. 
LEWIS & CLA.RK 
CD Ordinance 
Operator must have conservation plan or 
else notify supervisors. "Team" inspection. 
Voluntary solutions to violations stressed. 
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Forest practice lav/s must include provisions designed 
as guidlines for administration. A law must state, whether 
a management plan, harvesting plan or only a notice is to 
be required. It must state who will review the plans and 
v/hether they have right of approval. It may require agencies 
to follow a procedure in correcting violations. But it 
must also TDrovide a clear appellate procedure. 
Plan vs. notice 
The administering agency must be able to' evaluate 
private forestry operations. In general, laws have re­
quired either timber harvesting plans or a notice of oper­
ations. Klemperer (1971) commenting on the effectiveness 
of a regul8.tory system, said we are "unable to quantify 
net regional benefits in common units, but we should be 
able to rank forest management plans according to prefer-
ence.""^ In other words, plans are the measure of how ef­
fective forest practice regulations are. 
The Oregon Forest Practice Act requires that: 
An operator, timber ovmer or landowner, before 
commencing an operation, shall notify the State 
Forester., . . 
An operator . . . shall notify the State For­
ester of any subsequent change. 
This is the "notice" requirement; California's re­
quirement for "plans" reads: 
No person shall conduct timber operations \mless 
a timber harvesting plan prepared by a registered 
professional forester has been submitted for such 
operations to the State Forester. 
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EPA's model requires the same "plan" for larger operations, 
but requires only a notice for smaller ones. 
There is a tradeoff between the costs to the landowner 
and administrators, of harvesting plans, and the possible 
loss of effectiveness by requiring only notice. In the 
state of V/ashington, a combined approach was tried. The 
law allows the board to classify forest practices according 
to their potential for damage. 
Class I: Minimal or specific forest practices 
that have no direct potential for damaging a piib-
lic resource may be conducted without submitting 
an application or notification; 
Class II: Forest practices V7hich have a less 
than ordinary potential for damaging a public re­
source . . . may begin five calendar days . , , 
after written notification by the operator . . . 
Class III: Forest practices other than those 
contained in class I, II or IV. A class III ap­
plication must be approved or disapproved by the 
department within fourteen calendar da.ys. 
Class IV; Forest practices ... on platted 
lands , . . lands being converted to another use 
... or which have a potential for substantial 
impact on the environment and therefore require 
an evaluation by the depa,rtment as to whether or 
not a detailed statement must be prepared pur­
suant to the state Environmental Policy Act. 
Though the v^ording is a little confusing, it is clear 
that the legislature tried to combine effectiveness with 
efficiency. But the plan has potential for turning into 
an administrative nightmare, 
Montana's proposal required only a notice of operation. 
It also provided that: 
With written approval of the department, ah 
operator' may include in the notice required . . . 
any or all forest practices commenced during the 
calendar 7/ear, 
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This provision, if applied to industry operations within 
the state, woiild allow them to file a single notice cover­
ing all their Montana operations. 
Another a^lternative is proposed hy the CD Ordinance, 
In attempting to integrate the law v/ith existing programs 
and reduce costs, it provides that; 
Any land occupier who has a district-approved 
conservation plan which includes an erosion and 
sediment control section, or any land occupier 
v/ho has a long-range timber harvesting plan v^hich 
includes an erosion and sediment control section 
approved by the district , , , shall be deemed to 
be in compliance with this ordinance. 
Land occupiers without conservation or timber harvesting 
plans must either agree to draft one or stibmit a written 
7 notice of operations to the district. 
This provision could be utilized also in a state law. 
The law could use either the same requirement, or could 
require state-approved plans. Neither would increase the 
bureaucracy radically, since state uinit foresters presently 
provide management planning service to anyone who asks. 
The Idaho law — and Montana's proposal — contains 
v,'hat Gary Moon (1975b) called an "excellent administrative 
feature." The provision reads: 
The initial purchaser of forest tree species 
v/hich have been harvested from forest lands . . . 
must receive and keep on file a copy of the notice 
. . . relating to the harvesting practice. Such 
notice shall be available for inspection upon 
request by the department at all reasonable times. 
Such a provision increases the costs of public and private 
99 
administration. Does it pay for itself in increased effec­
tiveness? The apparent objective was to let the industry 
itself police the fcyppo logger, 
RECOMW^EHDATIOK: 
Over the short run, the best regulatory strategy for 
Montana is a simple notice requirement. But a notice of 
operations does not assure good forestry. Over the long 
haul, an overall management plan provides good forestrj'- and 
a better future. If managers could see the advantage in 
it — a provision in the law that operations v/ith long-
range managem.ent plans need not file notices — they Vv'ould 
support such an option. 
Approvals 
Receipt of notice or plan triggers one of two options 
by the administering agency. In the California Class laws, 
the agency must approve or reject the ha,rvesting plans. 
In the Oregon Class laws, no action by the agency is pro­
vided for, 
'Which option is preferable? Prom the standpoint of 
foresters, the plan or notice should be seen by profession­
als somewhere along the route. If the plan has been pre­
pared by a professional, as in California, it would mean 
u-nnecessary duplication of effort for foresters in the 
government to review it. But if the notice or plan is a 
spontaneous creation of the operator, it should be checked. 
But none of the lav/s work this way. Those that have less 
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stringent notification requirements also require less 
administrative a.pproval. 
Prom the burea-ucrat' s point of view, the administrative 
burden would increase substantially with the higher level 
of action called for. They may view increased responsi­
bility with relish or dread. If there is adequate funding, 
bureaucrats seldom ba.lk at taking on new powers. 
The SAP Task Force (1975) recommends that administra­
tive procedures should not act to inhibit, or "overmanage" 
the landowner's plans. Administration should be invisible 
to the good manager, biit stop the bad one. Efficiency, 
then, is a consideration. R^^les which require extensive 
delays or axiproval v/here potential for damage is small, 
work to the operator's disadvantage. 
RECOT'lVIioNLATION; 
For operations which are insignificant or acceptable, 
there should "be no delays caused by administrative require­
ments. But administrative officers should have clear re­
sponsibility — written into the law if necessary — to 
halt or prevent an operation on the basis of the notice 
or plan filed, if it shows the operation to be damaging. 
Insipections 
Inspections provide the next step in enforcement of 
forest practice regulations. Hov; raa,ny are warranted, how 
often held and how intensive should they be? 
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The lav/s vv'hich require strict reviev*; of operations 
also require more inspections. California.'s la.w requires 
inspections before, during and after the operations. So 
does Washington's. The EPA proposal requires only that 
"the director shall make such inspections as he deems nec­
essary to enforce the provisions of this act." Several 
commentators on EPA's first draft recommended reducing 
administrative costs by dropping a specified number of 
O 
required inspections, such as three. (Johnson, 1975) 
Oregon's law does not require any inspections. How­
ever, the Forestry Department divides operations into high, 
medium a,nd low priorities, inspecting them three, two and 
one time, respectively.^ (Mattock, 1977) 
Idaho's lav/ does not require inspections, either. 
Jack Gillette states that inspections are done on a ran­
dom basis, priorities assigned to reported violations and 
areas of high damage potential, 
RECOMMENDATION: 
A requirement for inspections in a Montana Forest 
Practice law might provoke added opposition. But it might 
also, if passed, give the agency administering the act a 
legal basis for requesting added appropriations in order 
to carry out inspections, which apparently they do anyway. 
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The inspection may turn up violations of the law, or 
violations may be reported to the agency. A forest prac­
tice act must provide a procedure to halt the violations 
and correct any damage. 
In most acts, depa^rtment representatives are given 
the right of entry upon private land. The provision is 
probably superfluous since the department is delegated 
enforcement pov/ers any^/vay. Once it ho.s confirmed a vio­
lation, the depa-rtment must take action. 
The EPA model reads: 
When the department determines that an oper­
ator has violated this act . . , Jx"Q shall serve 
a notice o"f violation upon the operator , , , 
specify [ingl the nature of the violation, 
V/hen a notice of violation is served . . . the 
director (a) shall issue and serve an order upon 
the operator directing: that the operator cease fur­
ther viola,tion . . . (b) may issue and serve an 
order upon the operator , . ., directing the oper­
ator to repair the damage or correct the unsat­
isfactory condition. 
In California, the agency must go into court: 
The State Forester may bring an action to 
enjoin the violation, or threatened violation, 
of any provision of this chapter . , . the court 
may issue a temporary restraining order, , , 
The court may , , , order the defendent to 
take appropriate emergency corrective action, 
authorize the State Forester to order the defen­
dent to take such action, or authorize the State 
Forester to take emergency action. 
Thus, in California authorities must obtain a court order. 
This incurs more delay and expense as v/ell as tying up the 
courts. But it also motivates both parties to seek a 
voluntary solution rather than coercive action. 
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Oregon's provision is almost identical to the EPA's, 
calling for a mandatory stop work order and discretionary 
order to repair damages. But, in oractice, the rule is 
not as rigid. In FY76, Oregon reported only 157 violations 
out of 8,760 contacts. But there were 991, or 11,3 percent, 
which required "remedial action," In fact, this 11,3 per­
cent were violators, but the department chose to try to 
achieve voluntary compliance. (Oregon, 1977) 
The CD Ordinance, again, has a unique approach; 
V/here the supervisors determine that the conserva­
tion standards are not being observed, they will 
proceed to seek a voluntary solution to the pro­
blem, using the following sequence: 
1 )  . . .  w r i t t e n  n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  l a n d  
occupier that an apparent violation exists . , , 
2) , , , discuss alternative solutions with 
the land occupier, offer technical assistance 
. . . and provide information regarding, financial 
assistance. 
3) , . . specify, in writing, a reasonable 
length of time to complete the corrective measures. 
4) . . , land occupier . . .may use other than 
district assistance. 
Failing these mes.sures, the conservation district may 
petition the district court to stop the violation. 
Repairing damage caused by Violations costs time and 
money. It requires a certain degree of legal coercion to 
assign the costs of correction to the proper party. In 
every law, the department is allowed to make corrections 
and collect the costs in the form of a lien against the 
owner or operator. 
The California Class laws allow the allow the depart­
ment to correct any damages and charge the parties. In 
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Oregon and Idaho, the board must first approve the action 
and expenditure. In Oregon, the state has spent $150,000 
in four years on damage repair, but no data was available 
on how difficult it was to procure reimbursement. 
The Idaho lav/ reads that the lien should not be placed 
on the landowner unless the resources of the operator are 
insufficient. In this manner, says Gillette (1977), the 
landowner is not penalized for wrongdoings by the operator. 
But E5uch a provision wotild also not motivate a landov?ner 
to take an active interest in how his land is treated. 
Montana's 1973 bill contained provisions for liens to 
recover damage repair costs. As one of the chief items of 
controversy, it v/as dropped from the 1975 version. But its 
absense left the department with no legal means of paying 
the cost of repairs. If the bill had p8,ssed and the sit-
lAation arisen, the Division v\rould be hesitant to move to 
effectuate repairs. 
REC0«MEMDATX0W: 
Legal avenues to stop violations.are necessary. But 
they should not incur unnecessary delay and hardship, A 
provision to recover the state's costs of damage correction 
is vital. Its absence creates potential for an unacceptable 
decline in effectiveness, 
/Vippeals -process 
A just and efficient appellate process to ensure fair 
(and lawftil) treatment of landowners and operators must be 
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provided by law. The vvPCA Task Force (1975) recommended 
that the appeals process should not direct the appellant 
to the Same board or agency making the original decision. 
It should comply v/ith all requirements of diie process, and 
avoid or provide for the possibility of conflicts of interest. 
In the EPA model, Idaho's law and Montana's bill, 
aggrieved parties would appeal to a board and beyond that 
to the courts. Oregon's Legislature created a committee 
of the board to hear appeals, v.'ith judicial review avail­
able. Washington has a separate appeals board, with a 
lengthy set of procedures. Hearings before the board may 
be formal or informal; if appeal is taken to the courts, 
informal hearings receive de novo review, California's 
legislature, apparently feeling that judicial determin-^ 
ation of violations in the first instance was adequate, 
did not provide for appeal. 
RECOMMEWDATIOK: 
The simplest procedures are invariably the best from 
the bureaucrats point of view. They are also the cheapest 
and easiest to understand for owners and operators. Legal 
recognition of due process and court appeal is also a good 
political maneuver. 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
EPA's 
Model 
Operator licenses, provision for citizen's 
suits, no provision for conversion. 
Variance from rules allov/ed. 
CALIFORNIA' S  
Law 
Operator licenses, zoned timberland re­
quires permit for conversion. Variance 
from rules provided for. 
WASHINGTON's 
Law 
Board must set policy on public education 
and training, recommends needed research. 
Conversion classified type IV practice. 
OREGON's 
Law 
Does not preclude conversion. 
IDAHO's 
Law 
Does not preclude conversion. 
MONTANA•s 
1975 Bill 
Time limit on conversions is normal amount 
of time allowed for reforestation. 
LEVv'IS & CLARK 
CD Ordinance 
Supervisors may help land occupier in 
seeking financial assistance. 
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V/orrell (1975) v/rites that some form of forest practice 
program can be designed to meet any obstacles. Governments 
have tried tax incentives, technical assistance, cost-
share plans and marketing aids, to name a few. There is 
a federal assistance program to meet most recognized pro­
blems. There should be a means of integrating federal, 
state and local programs into a forest practice law. 
The CD Ordinance makes an attempt at this; 
When a land occupier is required to apply 
conservation practices for the control of soil 
erosion and sediment damage, as specified by the 
supervisors, the supervisors may assist the land 
occupier to obtain available cost-share funds 
from existing sources. 
The supervisors may delay the implementation deadline for 
corrective action until such time as funds from federal or 
state sources become available. Through this, provision, 
the district prevents costs from being a disincentive to 
good ma.nagement. 
A similar provision could be written into state law. 
Such an inclusion may be quite effective for publicity and 
political purposes. State unit foresters already perform 
these functions, but are not utilized fully. 
In addition, Montana has no legal authorization to 
perform CFW functions. A legal statement of the purpose 
and policy of the CFM program may serve a purpose. 
Costs are the main disincentive to improved management 
and increased costs one of the most serious arguments against 
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a forest practice act. Any provision serving to reduce 
costs would improve the acceptability of the law. Comments 
on the EPA's model pointed out that small landowners simply 
could not afford to comply with the act; they do not have 
the financial resources for management practices without 
outside aid, and they do not keep accurate or consistent 
enough records to make good economic decisions. In addition, 
they lack knowledge of the legal requirements, and some­
times they j^ist "olain forget to report. (U.S. EPA, 1975) 
County commissioners in northwestern T/lontana endorse 
"the concept of good forest practices." But they prefer the 
incentive approach, particuls-rly the funding of state nur-
series to provide more planting stock for private owners, 
(intermountain Logging News, 1974) 
Some laws, such as California's, require harvesting 
plans designed by professionals. Small landowners just 
cannot afford them. Wiany are cutting their woodlots only 
for the emergency income; they cannot pay for professional 
planning and other environmental constraints — and they-
should not if the public is receiving the benefits, Y/riting 
the law so that professionals in government do the planning, 
or approve the operation, reduces the cost to the landowner 
and increases his inclination to abide by the lav/. 
RECOMT^^ENDATION: 
The landowners and operators are paying the full costs 
of regulation and the public is receiving a majority of 
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the benefits. Forest practice legislation, while not 
designed as incentive legislation, could benefit fl'om 
provisions clarifying assistance programs and their, re­
lationship to the good management required by the act. 
Variance 
Some legislatures have written into law a provision 
for variance from forest practice rules. By doing this, 
they are enfu^ring a degree of flexibility in enforcement. 
Not all managers have the same objectives. They may choose 
to vary rotation age, harvesting practices or other stand 
characteristics to fit the product they are growing. Their 
practices will differ accordingly, 
Vve have two options, V'/e may write separate regulations 
for every conceivable management situation, . Or we could 
allow, by law, a manager to propose certain practices he 
thinks would fit his purposes. 
The EPA model, in response to comment, includes a 
provision for variances; 
Permission to condxict forest practices in a 
manner different from that required by the reg­
ulations may be granted , , , upon a determination 
by the director that operations conducted pursuant 
to that permission will be as effective or more 
effective in protecting the environment, 
Cfilifornia' s Forest Practice Act allows the Board to 
exempt altogether certain management practices. 
The board may exempt activities limited to 
the cutting or removal of trees for the purpose 
of constructing or maintaining a right-of-way 
for utility lines or the planting, growing. 
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nurturing, shapin^^,she8,ring, removal or 
harvest of immature trees for Christmas 
Trees or other ornamental purposes or minor 
forest products, including fuelv.'ood. 
EECOMM-.KDATIOW: 
A brief statement approving the use of alternative 
management practices in certain situations v/ould be an 
excellent political and administrative strategy. 
Conversion 
The SAP Task Force (1975) recommended that every forest 
practice act include a provision for conversion of land to 
other uses after timber operations. Its absence v,'ould lend 
fuel to the "takings" argument. 
The Oregon Class laws very simply allow conversion, 
Idaho's states "this act does not preclude the conversion 
of forest land to any other use," California's law is 
more involved. Potential converters must file an appli­
cation for conversion with the board. If the areas are 
already zoned for timberland, the board can only approve 
the application if: 
(1) the conversion v/ould be in the public 
interest; and 
(2) the conversion v^^ould not have a substan­
tial and unmitigated adverse affect upon 
the continued timber-growing use or open 
space use of other land , . ; and 
(3) the soils, slopes and watershed conditions 
would be suitable for the uses proposed. 
The existence of an opportunity for alternative uses or 
the uneconomic character of the present use are not 
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sufficient grounds for,approval of conversions in the law. 
Strict regulations over the shifting of land uses is the 
evident objective in California. 
V/ashiiigton's law simply states that a notice of oper­
ations or application (depending on the Class) may specify 
that a conversion is likely to take place. The practice 
then becomes Class IV, subject to a review for the need 
for an EIS, 
RECOM' iEHDATIOr^l; 
Unplanned conversion, says the 0.3. Forest Service 
(1956), "may adversely affect future timber supply." But 
restricting conversions may not be politically feasible in 
Montana, Individuals should have a right to change the use 
of his land for whatever reason he chooses. But he must 
not be allowed to damage other people's property or re­
sources by his action. The solution lies in providing that 
conversion may take place without restriction as long as 
the landovmer still abides by all forest practice stan­
dards in effect for the practices he undertakes. 
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Notes; 
1. "California Class" is a term I have coined to refer to 
the laws of California and Washington and the EPA model 
which, as I state in the text, are inclined to be more 
coercive than "Oregon Class" laws, which include the 
lava's of Oregon and Idaho and Montana's bill. 
2. The policy of the Federation of Rocky Mountain States 
is an example of meaningless terms: "prompt and com­
plete implementation of multiple- and coordinated-use 
concepts," (Lamm, 1973) 
3. V^illiam B, Clothier, EPA Counsel in Johnson, 1975. 
4. See page 49. 
5» One industry-sponsered newsletter finds nothing wrong 
with the present operation. It quotes the Dean of the 
OSU Forestry School as saying that he thinks industry 
members on the board speed acceptance of and coopera­
tion with the rules in the community. One citizen 
member believes that the board needs the expectise of 
the industry members to keep from being overrun by the 
Forestry Department propaganda. (Oregon C.ofC,, 19774) 
5. Klemperer, 1971. P, 14, 
6. EPA's opinion is that site-specific management plans 
should be approved by the state' s v/ater quality agency 
rather than by foresters. (Agee, 1975) 
7. Since 60 percent of the bona-fide farmers in the county 
already have conservation plans, it v/ould not place an 
excessive burden on these managers, but only on those 
which have yet to join the program, 
8. One person pointed out that there are over 10,000 
timber operations in Oregon and Washington alone, a 
figure which argues against numerous inspections, 
(Johnson, 197^5) 
9. A recent progress report showed 35 percent success rate 
at these goals. But much of the other 65 percent were 
discretionary determinations. The operations did not 
receive the full treatment because ofthe brevity of 
activity a low damage T)otential or the established 
reliability of the operator. (Oregon, 1977) 
10. Wote that the Slash Disposal Law, passed in the wake 
of forest practice defeat, did contain the same lien 
provision — unargued. (3. 28-407, R.C.M.) 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Over the course of this study, I have made several 
observations and conclusions. These, I would like to 
clarify and summarize in the following chapter. In ad­
dition, I would like to enlarge my recommendations with 
practical suggestions for forest practice law.. 
One of the chief conclusions to "be dravm from a study 
I of Montana's legislation regards its political viability. 
I 
I I There are strong indications that political opposition is 
[ 
based not upon the merits of any bill, but on the legalistic 
philosophy they represent. It is not the form of regula-
i 
j tion that is opposed; it is the practice itself, 
\ On paper, the objections look reasonable; Liens, 
i scenic values, variances for Christmas Tree farms. But 
1 in the 1975 version of the bill, every objection was an-
1 swered—to the detriment of the quality—yet the opposition 
did not weaken. 
If this conclusion is valid this thesis, centered 
around comparisons with other, similar, legislation, is 
useful only as an introduction to the future where such 
opposition has withered. 
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In spite of such opposition, or perhaps because of 
it, there are several goals toward v/hich we can work in 
prescribing legislation. The formulation of these goals 
is the result of this study, and I have incorporated them 
into my recommendations. 
Goal ;fli Keep it simple. The clearer and more under­
standable a piece of legislation is, the easier it will be 
for legislators and landowners to judge it on its merits. 
Obscure or conflicting Vi/ording and complicated procedures 
serve only to frustrate the subjects of the law, increasing 
negative attitudes. 
On this count, Oregon Glass laws rate highly. The 
language is relatively clear and brief; the procedures 9,re 
not too hard to follow. 
The value of rule-making in light of this goal is not 
clear. Legislative rules tend to complicate the law, but 
the alternative, administrative rules, is not nearly as 
simple. There is but one solution: the legislature should 
not make the rules itself, but should state in the lavi/ that 
administrators be restricted both politically and procedur-
8.11y from making the process too complex. 
Goal ;r2: Keep bureaucracy and administrative costs 
to a minimum. This goal links in with the preceding one; 
it has value also in the potential increases in efficiency 
and effectiveness of administration. Its political value 
stems from the grov/ing popular fear of burgeoning and 
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uncontrolalDle government. The ^eduction of bureaucracy 
\ 
I 
should be a permanent policy go^l for all legislation. 
Drafters should take every opportunity to tie new programs 
into existing ones, eliminate useless ones and reduce the 
need for interagency red tape if the benefits are not worth 
the added hassle. It y/ill pay off in political acceptance. 
For forest practice legislation, satisfaction of this 
goal requires working the new program into existing jobs 
and administrative structure. For instance, a requirement 
for management plans would not be unjustified; state unit 
foresters are set up to do this service currently. But a 
new requirement for approval, of either plans or notices, 
would be less acceptable. 
The administering agency, though, mtist not be restricted 
in its duties. It must be able, if it perceives a possible 
violation from reviewing the notice, to act upon that in­
formation, either by restraining the landovmer or conducting 
a, followup inspection. This provision was not written into 
past Montana proposals. 
Goal //3: Protect the rights and liberties of the 
Individual. The choice of regulatory means to enforce 
policy cannot be justified simply by noting that the "Taking 
IsBue" is a red herring. A government is what the people 
want it to be; if the majority fa.vored exclusive property 
rights, that is the system v.'e would have. But government 
also attends to its minorities. Just because the group 
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that advocates exclusive property rights is in the minority, 
that is insufficient reason to if^nore them. 
The place to put this gog,l into practice is not in the 
statement of policy. It is in the involvement of the gov­
erned in their own decisions. Throughout these recommen­
dations, I have taken every opportunity to v^rite the local 
citizen, logger and landowner into the process. Local 
hoards shotild h?.ve decision-making authority and, vandalizing 
the "jury of ones peers" concept, should have a majority of 
people who are personally involved in the questions that 
will come "before it. These boards should not act as appel­
ate bodies on their own decisions; a statev;ide board is 
needed. But that, too, must be composed of persons fully 
knowledgable of the techniques and practical, problems 
involved. 
The CD Ordinance is a good example of the use of local 
law designed to get local citizens to make their own de­
cisions, The local supervisors are responsible citizens 
who at the ssjae time have their livings to make from the 
land. Their decisions are likely to be biased in favor of 
the local residents and economic base. But it is the choice 
of the citizens rather than administrators or political 
appointees. 
Goal #4: Ensure future flexibility, Forestry is 
rapidly changing, in both scope and technology. Not only 
are there consta,ntly new technologies to replace old ones, 
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there is a continuous discovery of new resources and values 
that can "be gained from the woods. Achieving this goal 
means not just preferring administratively flexible stan­
dards to legislated ones; it means replacing any hidebound 
rule-making system v.'ith one that reflects a.ccurately the 
vi?ants of the prople and the needs of the resource. 
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